SOME ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY TERRORISM Milan Milosevic, Ljubomir Stajic, Police Academy Col. Milan V. Petkovic, Army of Yugoslavia, Belgrade "Meaning" Theoretical Review of the Socialist Party of Serbia Jun 1998., 4-5 It is not easy to define the phenomenon of terrorism because of different perceptions of the nature of activities implied by this notion. However, having in mind different forms and contradictory interpretations of dangerous, anti-social and inhuman activities in certain environments, terrorism can be defined, most generally, as organized violence with the intention to cause fear and personal insecurity of citizens and to threaten the State authority or achieve other political goals. Because it is impossible to define terrorism precisely and completely, it is usually defined pragmatically ("technically") mainly for the needs of legislative bodies and security institutions. In this sense, characteristic is the definition used by the analytical services of the US intelligence for the statistical survey of international i.e. transnational terrorism.[1] So, this notion implies use or threat of use of a special kind of violence which creates disturbance and which serves political goals of an individual or a group, irrespective of the fact whether they acted in favour of the established State authorities or against them, when such an action is aimed at influencing the positions and behaviour of a group (which is also the target of such an action) which is broader than direct victims and when, because of nationality or foreign links of perpetrators, the place where a terrorist act is committed, nature of institutional or human victims or mechanisms, its framework surpasses national framework. [2] Classifications of terrorism are also diverse and numerous, depending on the criteria which are taken as the basis for classification, but also on the interpretation of the notion of terrorism. Recently, internationally significant terrorism has escalated - terrorism with a foreign element - which, in a certain way, surpasses the importance and social danger of terrorism limited within each individual country (internal, domestic terrorism). Instances of mass terrorism have increased compared to individual terrorism and this classification has been made on the basis of passive subject - victim as the criterion. Terrorism can be then classified as selective and non-selective, the criterion being the fact that the violence is committed against the predetermined victim or a passive subject selected at random. The same applies to other forms of terrorism which certain theoreticians sometimes emphasize as separate forms: compromise terrorism (terrorism of a political group or organization for the purpose of extorting concessions from the authorities of the country with which it is not in direct conflict, e.g. occupation of the West German Consulate by Ustashas), then the so-called technological, agitation, demonstrative and other kinds of terrorism. In the contemporary conditions, terrorism is also used as the so-called State (inter-State) terrorism by one State (or a military-political alliance) against another sovereign State when it is classified as a means for achieving goals in low-intensity conflicts. However, in the true sense of the word, contemporary terrorism can only be international, i.e. transnational, and internal (domestic). Transnational terrorism has foreign elements and constitutes an action taken basically by autonomous non-State subjects, regardless of the fact whether they enjoy a certain degree of moral or material support of benevolent governments and their intelligence services. Unlike transnational terrorism, domestic terrorism is committed by autonomous non-State perpetrators and is limited to only one country, i.e. affects citizens of only one country. Methods employed by terrorists can be different: infiltration of armed groups in the territories of sovereign States for the purpose of committing murders and other crimes, hijacking, kidnapping and hostage taking in order to extort concessions through blackmail, arson, bomb attacks and the like. Proceeding from this, the international law condemns any terrorism and prohibits it as a method of political struggle. Therefore, it is particularly important to separate terrorism as socially and morally unacceptable phenomenon from legal and legitimate forms of struggle for national and social liberation and the adequate criteria for this are the mentioned criminal ways of their commission. If a political group uses in its struggle the mentioned and other means in contravention of international (criminal) law then such an action must be considered terrorist and its perpetrators deserve general condemnation irrespective of their ideological orientation. Contemporary terrorism has been in constant expansion primarily in respect of its quality.[3] Due to the constants which generate it, it renews itself in cycles, each time with additional elements of surprise. With the continued use of new, more sophisticated and effective methods and forms of actions, contemporary terrorism (international, but also nationalist, local forms of terrorism) can have different short- and long-term effects, especially when this kind of criminal acts is combined with subversive propaganda. The separatist-terrorist movement of Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Metohija counts on the presentation of its "struggle for human rights" in front of the world public opinion. It employs violent methods - assassinations, diversions, sabotages - and political methods - "one-nation poisoning", referendum on secession, establishment of illegal government, "parallel" authority and educational systems, etc. On the basis of the above, it is clear that, in the contemporary conditions, terrorism is not only the most brutal form of violence, as usually thought and named, but also frequently the planned, overall and continued conflict most often between destructive subjects and the current authorities of a State (but also between States). In such case, harmonized unarmed and armed actions, independent and supported by foreign "sponsors", are aimed at creating such a situation in a victim State which would be favourable for the terrorists' interests and creators of crisis situations. Although it is generally known that terrorism as a social phenomenon appeared long ago, two contemporary forms are of particular importance - "liberal" (non-State) terrorism characteristic for the 1970s and 1980s and the current "terrorism at the end of the 20th century". The period of "liberal" terrorism lasted from mid-1960s to 1990. In the said period, the majority of terrorist organizations "operated" in Western Europe, Japan and in the Middle and Near East. Organizations were created spontaneously and autochthonously as a response to the economic and social situation in their countries. This was, more or less, the period of "sincere revolutionary fervour" created as the result of increased dissatisfaction with the policy of the West European countries and Japan. This type of terrorism was also influenced by the terrorism of some Palestinian liberation organizations and groups, especially after the Israeli victory in the 1967 war, and by the beginning of birth of Islamic extremism in some African and Asian countries traditionally sensitive to the Islamic religious extremism. It is characteristic for this period that terrorist groups independently selected targets of their attacks and collected information about them. The element of self-sacrifice was evident in terrorist actions which limited with fanaticism (this element became one of the basic characteristics of terrorists from the Middle East, especially after the suddenly increased influence of Iranian Islamic fundamentalists in the 1980s). Faced with the escalation of not only internal but also international terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s, France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain and other leading West European States began to plan and apply special strategies in suppressing "liberal" terrorism. That strategy was primarily the combination of adequate police and legislative measures, both internally and internationally. Police measures constituted, in fact, the forming, specialization and training of special anti-terrorist teams within the existing police and military formations, such as NOCS in Italy, RAID in France, GSG-9 in Germany, ESI-Diana in Belgium, etc. However, important activities took place in the sphere of intelligence service since the problem of suppressing terrorism got a dominant place in the plans and programmes of almost all intelligence services. Moreover, some countries which were to a greater extent endangered by "liberal" terrorism also formed special security services (so-called internal intelligence services) which specialized in the suppression of internal extremism and terrorism. This was the case with the Central Bureau for General Investigations and Special Operations (UCIGOS) formed in early 1978 as the intelligence-security organization in the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs. UCIGOS collected information autonomously and carried out investigations in order to prevent and suppress terrorism and, at the same time, completed affairs for classical and judiciary police for the needs of the Democratic Security-Intelligence Service (SIS-De) whose personnel and material resources were very much engaged in the problem of terrorism. [4] As to the legislative measures in the suppression of terrorism on the international level, a considerable progress was made at the end of the 1960s and particularly in mid-1980s. In this context, certain acts of universal and regional character are of the greatest importance, since, in the meantime, terrorism acquired the dimensions of a global international problem, both in quantity and quality. Proceeding from this, in the given period, besides a number of resolutions of the United Nations, several significant multilateral agreements on the suppression of terrorism were concluded: convention on the prevention of illegal acts against the security of civil aviation of 23 September 1971; convention on the prevention and punishment of criminal offences against persons under international protection, including diplomatic representatives of 14 December 1973; international convention on the prohibition of hostage taking of 17 December 1979; US convention on the prevention and punishment of terrorist crimes against persons of international significance of 2 February 1971; European convention on the suppression of terrorism of 27 January 1977 and others. The General Assembly of the International Organization of Criminal Police (INTERPOL) also made maximum efforts in this field. Namely, only between 1967 and 1983, 17 resolutions were adopted pertaining to the criminal offences by which terrorism is committed. Among the subsequently adopted resolutions, the ones adopted in 1984 are of particular importance since they reflect the changed attitude of INTERPOL to the fight against terrorism by the explicit naming of terrorism ("Crime by the use of force known as terrorism", 1984, "Guidelines for the fight against international terrorism", 1986). Finally, certain internal legal acts whose provisions constitute a legal basis for the suppression of terrorist activities on the regional and global levels are also of importance. For example, this is the case of the US Act on the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of 31 July 1979. Namely, this Act increased the competence of the FBI in the field of investigating terrorism, including the so-called transnational terrorism, which does not include criminal offences committed in the USA. According to paragraph 531 of this Act, the term "terrorist activity" pertains, inter alia, to terrorist acts against any foreign State, and according to its paragraph 533 FBI is authorized to carry out investigations of such criminal offences irrespective of the fact that they were committed outside the USA and that they were committed beyond national borders in connection with the means used in such terrorist activities, persons - victims of such terrorist activities or places in which terrorists operate or request asylum. Since the 1970s, many countries have introduced crucial innovations in the material and criminal process laws, while other criminal and political measures have been taken and in most cases have yielded positive results in the fight against terrorism. This is particularly the case of encouragement to penitence which had remarkable results, especially in Italy, and fully justified its existence. Some of the countries most endangered by terrorism at the time also adopted separate laws and regulations incriminating terrorist activity as a whole while the prosecution bodies are given special competence and powers in respect of procedures. Thus, for example, in the FR of Germany, the Law against Terrorism (Antiterorism gesetz) was adopted in 1976 and amended in 1977; in France, the so-called Anti-ruffian Law (Anti-casseurs) was adopted in 1970; in Great Britain, the Prevention of Terrorism Act - Temporary Provision was adopted in 1970; in Spain, the Law on the Prevention Terrorism (La legge sul'antiterorismo) was adopted in 1978; etc. All countries introduced almost simultaneously in their criminal legislations a new criminal offence of "terrorism" which incriminates, first and foremost, non-selective, random terrorism (bomb attacks, arsons and the like); there are also examples that this criminal offence is provided for both by general legislation and separate laws. Thus, for example, in Spain, since 1971, two criminal offences named as terrorism have existed: one in the Military Criminal Law (Chapter IX, Art. 1, bis) and another in the Criminal Law ( Art. 260). [5] In early 1990s, autochthonous and more or less independent terrorist organizations characteristic for the model of "liberal" terrorism ("Red Brigades", "Direct Action", "Japanese Red Army") began to weaken and examine their fundamental principles. Before that, security forces took several significant and decisive actions in which some terrorist organizations were broken up. At the same time, terrorist organizations with different programmes and ideologies established links among themselves since they had a common interest in surviving. Within such a "international cooperation", terrorist organizations frequently established contacts with terrorist groups created with the help and support of specialized intelligence institutions of some countries. Currently, groups of terrorists which CIA formed and trained for the actions against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and other regions are the most dangerous in the world, the groups which were influenced by the hatred towards the "red enemy" in order to parry terrorism created and sponsored by the opponent. This was a "cold war investment" which brought profit, but which, now, asks for the payment.[6] Some of these groups have appeared in Kosovo and Metohija and they have, undoubtedly, contacted their previous employers. Islamic mercenary "commander Hatab", a Jordanian, after Afghanistan and Chechenya, found himself in Kosovo and Metohija as a mercenary of the so-called internationale; "accidental meeting" of US envoys Richard Holbrooke and Robert Gelbard with terrorists in the village of Junik during their visit to Kosovo and Metohija on 23 June 1998; establishment and ceremonial opening of the US information centre in Pristina when a US diplomat said that Americans would not forget Albanians; insistence of German Foreign Minister (and former chief of the BND intelligence service) Klaus Kinkel on the "special status" of Kosovo and Metohija; offer of the US association of retired and reserve members of the armed forces "Military Professional Resources Incorporated" (MPRI) to "render services" according to the same scenario used in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. It has become evident that there is an ever smaller number of traditional terrorist organizations and networks with a firm organization and guided from one centre, and a growing number of "domestic", ethnically and religiously inspired terrorists who appear to have publicity as their priority. Recently, the boundary between terrorism and organized crime has been lost, above all the illegal trafficking in narcotic drugs ("narcoterrorism"). In this context, notable are specific "symbioses" between terrorist organizations and mafia clans which operate in Peru, Colombia, Laos, Afghanistan and Lebanon.[7] Members of the security forces, especially uniformed police officers, are most frequently targets of attacks, i.e. tactical goals of the current terrorism. This primarily applies to the so-called random, non-selective terrorism, when police officers are killed or injured when defusing explosive devices, extinguishing arsons, securing persons, places, etc. However, police officers are very frequently "direct targets" of classic assassinations (from ambushes) and of armed attacks on police patrols, vehicles and stations. The past practice shows that the perpetrators of such crimes are most frequently extreme separatists, e.g. members of the Basque terrorist organization "State and Freedom" (ETA) in Spain, extreme wings of the Irish Republican Army (PIRA, INLA) and the Albanian secessionists in our country (so-called Kosovo Liberation Army - KLA), etc. Terrorism is ever more frequently used to cover up weaknesses and inability to impose one's own position or policy to a society. A typical example for this are terrorist acts of Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija, since, depending on the current international political situation, terrorists from this region more or less enjoy the support of some international factors. Such support to the existing terrorist organizations is manifested mainly in financing, arms deliveries, training, providing shelter, providing travel documents, logistic support and others, while, at the same time, direct terrorist support can be noted through the organization of terrorist groups which are infiltrated from their or third countries to the territory of the targeted country or are formed within the country whose security interests are to be endangered. Finally, some States directly commit terrorist acts through their intelligence services and other organizations specialized in such activities. Such an activity on the international level is conducive to the strengthening of the practice of the so-called double standard: one terrorism is condemned while the other is supported. Or, some countries are supported while others are punished for the same categories of terrorism. Such unprincipled position of certain States and, under their pressure, of a broad international community contributes that international conventions and acts on the suppression of terrorism are ineffective. Namely, about ten international summits on the fight against terrorism were held in the last decade alone. Various general principles have been adopted and concrete measures planned, from the agreement on the ban on export of arms and military equipment to those who support terrorism (Tokyo, 1986), agreement not to make concessions to terrorists in the case of hijacking and abduction ("The Group of 7", Venice, 1987), to the strong condemnation of all forms of terrorism (summit of 26 nations, Egypt, 1996), but terrorism has not been suppressed. On the contrary, the number of terrorist attacks in the world in 1995 increased by 37 per cent compared to 1994. As a response to that, many countries of the West have recently intensified police and legislative measures in the suppression of terrorism not only internally but also internationally. This, above all, applies to the internal terrorism in their own or allied States, but also to the transnational terrorism affecting their interests. Even those countries which did not incriminate terrorism directly in its general and basic form have done that explicitly in this period (e.g. Russia), while some of them have adopted special legislations in order to prevent and suppress terrorism. This is the case of the USA where, until recently, only 16 federal States had laws sanctioning terrorist acts. In the meantime, the Federal Criminal Act has been adopted on anti-terrorist actions and capital punishment which the US President signed in April 1996. The Act provides for more severe sentences for a general criminal offence and specific forms of terrorism and wider competence of the USA in the punishment of the financing of terrorist groups. [8] Thus, for example, after the changes in 1994, the FBI is composed of the headquarters, regional offices, residual agencies, separate regional centres and services and offices of legal attaches. Separate services also include the Domestic Counterterrorism Centre, established after the bomb attack on the federal building in Oklahoma City on 19 April 1995 (169 victims) and the adoption of a separate Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act in 1995, which is competent for the prevention, investigation and prosecution of terrorist activities. [9] Albanian separatists have rich experience in the commission of terrorist activities of all kinds against Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia, particularly from the period before the dismemberment of the former Yugoslavia and during the process of its dismemberment.[10] Namely, several hundred Albanians, deserters from the Yugoslav National Army and false asylum seekers from the FR of Yugoslavia participated, as members of Croatian and Muslim rebel formations, in the armed conflicts with the Yugoslav armed forces and the armed forces of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parallelly with this, several thousand Albanians from the FR of Yugoslavia capable to serve in the army completed the several-month military and terrorist training in Albania, some Islamic and NATO countries. The best known camps for training terrorists in Albania are Ljabinot near Tirana, Tropoja near the Yugoslav-Albanian border, Kuks and Bajram Curi near the Yugoslav-Albanian border which are, at the same time, the headquarters for the command and units of the Albanian army and police for the northeastern part of Albania and the centres for recruiting extreme followers of the overthrown Albanian president Sali Berisha; in Turkey: military camp and the training ground for the training of commandos of the Turkish army in the vicinity of the town of Bolu; in Iran: training camps for the members of the Revolutionary Guards at Marv Dasht and Qom, special camps for recruitment and training of mujahedeens in Bosnia; one of them was discovered in Fojnica in 1996 and destroyed in the energetic action of SFOR, while the commander of that camp, who was also the coordinator for terrorism in the Balkans, Iranian intelligence agent Ali Reza Bayata, avoided arrest. Not disregarding experience as terrorists against the Serbian nation in the past periods (until 1991), the violence resorted to by the Albanians against the Serbian nation today, i.e. against Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia, is very much different from the violence in the past. Terrorism of the Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija is characteristic by its "sponsored" terrorism mentioned above. It can be said with great probability that the escalation of terrorist activities of Albanian separatists is also a result of a broader strategy through which foreign interests are being realized. However, besides this, the terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija has not changed its original pattern. This is confirmed by the fact that Albanian terrorists enjoy a broad "covert" support of some international factors through the financing, arms deliveries, training, providing shelter, supplies and the like. Direct support of some countries in this field has become less covert, which is manifested by organizing terrorist groups which are then infiltrated in Kosovo and Metohija. This has enabled the terrorists to occasionally change the country in which they form main bases, depending on the situation on the terrain. Viewed from the global aspect, there is no doubt that the terrorism of mass dimensions in Kosovo and Metohija is considered and accepted as a possible substitute for an armed aggression. Therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that in the evaluation of geostrategic interests in the Balkans Kosmet is selected as "the weakest link on a chain" of Yugoslavia's stability and security. Such evaluation is based on two crucial facts: 1) that the majority of population in the province is the Albanian population indoctrinated for decades with the idea of creating "Greater Albania", and 2) that Kosmet is the most undeveloped region in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Guided by the evaluation that terrorism (at least at present) is the most adequate form of struggle against the FR of Yugoslavia, those who plan and organize terrorism are trying to use the current international situation without covering up their intentions and coordinated activities. The committed terrorist attacks point to the good training and equipment of terrorists, which is also confirmed by the seized weapons and equipment used for the commission of these attacks, as well as by many confessions of arrested terrorists. The aim of the terrorist attacks of Albanian separatists in Kosovo and Metohija is to realize several goals in stages which are, within the overall goal, the incitement, permanent maintenance and management of the crisis which means: creating fear among non-Albanian citizens as well as among those Albanians who are loyal to the State of Serbia; completion of the expulsion of non-Albanian population; keeping the authorities and security forces in constant tension and uncertainty of armed rebellion; internationalization of their own goals which happen to be the same as the geopolitical goals of big powers in the Balkans; imposition of the fait accompli policy on the Governments of the FR of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. Following the recipe of many other terrorist organizations, terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija declare themselves fighters against the State and in this context they select targets of their attacks. However, as the basic element of terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija is the disrespect for the principles of humanitarian law, which is also the characteristic of terrorism of other countries. The most frequent targets of attacks are the least protected categories (women, children, the old and ailing, etc.). Accordingly, terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija is certainly characterized by irrationality, politically motivated intentions, good organization, amorality, variety of targets, mass participation, foreign support, etc., but also by primitiveness, brutality and cruelty. The publicity given to them by foreign mass media enables them to state publicly their motives and goals and some foreign representatives and media are used as a communication medium through which fear of brutality is intended for the public and the demand for the realization of political goals to the government. The financing of this terrorist activity is based on two principles. The first principle is self-financing by collecting "war tax" from the population and by engaging in almost all criminal activities (drug trafficking, illegal trade in arms, etc.) as the basic activities. The second principle implies receiving help from foreign "friends", i.e. countries which tolerate or encourage terrorism in our territory. Terrorist actions are planned very carefully and in detail both on the strategic and local levels. As far as the strategic level is concerned, notable is the choice of time, place, target and effect of an attack in the function of foreign policy. For example, whenever international fora discussed the imposition of sanctions on the FR of Yugoslavia or even a military intervention the number and brutality of terrorist attacks increased drastically. As to the local level, great attention in planning is devoted to the element of surprise, choice of target, status of persons selected as targets and their property. Special attention is devoted to the manner of commission of terrorist actions which are in the function of secession as the ultimate political goal. As already mentioned, terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija particularly intensified after the outbreak of the civil war in the territory of the former SFR of Yugoslavia and culminated in 1996, 1997 and especially in 1998. In this context, certain tendencies of terrorists can be noted. Firstly, after the initial attacks on the Serbian population, State authorities and their representatives, the focus of these attacks has shifted to the Albanian population who do not support terrorists and their goals. Analyses show that the number of killed Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija is two times greater than non-Albanian population. Secondly, the places selected as targets of attacks are not ethnically pure (the places with non-Albanian population are intentionally selected). Thirdly, terrorists wish to control as larger part of the territory as possible in order to ensure a base for unhindered movement, equipment deliveries and recruitment of new men which is obviously in the function of the preparations for secession when internal and international political conditions are created for that. The above tendencies can be illustrated by statistical data (see the table). Namely, from January 1991 to 25 June 1998, 680 terrorist acts were committed in Kosovo and Metohija, while the growth index for the first six months of 1998 was 10 times greater than in the entire 1997, i.e. four times greater than in the 1991-1997 period. In the period between 1 January 1998 and 25 June 1998 alone, 546 terrorist acts were committed, 37.3 per cent of them against police buildings and police officers. 342 terrorist attacks were carried out against citizens and other buildings in which 44 people were killed (28 Albanians, 14 Serbs and 2 Romanies). Kidnappings which are performed for the purpose of realizing political goals and gaining concessions, as a new form of terrorism in our territory, are also widely resorted to. In the said period, terrorist abducted 72 persons (48 Serbs and Montenegrins, 18 Albanians, 4 Romanies, one Muslim and a national of the FYR of Macedonia) and killed 13 of them. During terrorist attacks, Albanian separatists, in individual or group attacks, used automatic weapons 246 times, automatic weapons and mortars in 63 cases, snipers in 36 cases, hand grenades in 16 cases, explosive devices in 3 cases and pistol in 2 cases, and caused arson of several Serb houses in 4 cases. In 166 cases, they threatened with the use of firearms. In addition to the above acts of terrorism, 20 cases in which vehicles were stopped, IDs were requested and passengers were searched by masked and armed persons on some roads in Kosovo and Metohija were reported, as well as 29 cases of raids by these persons in the houses and other buildings where they seized weapons, which is qualified as a severe criminal offence. A conclusion can be drawn from the above that terrorism is the evil of the contemporary age, that it exists in many countries, that it is manifested in various forms and that, in any case, it is anti-social and anti-humanistic violence against citizens and States inspired by political goals. It can be also concluded that the contemporary terrorism (particularly terrorism of international significance) is escalating and that it renews itself in cycles with additional elements of surprise. The ever stronger link between terrorism and separatism can be also noted, which is best illustrated by terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija. Because of that, many countries, including ours, take various measures to fight terrorism, not only internally but also internationally. 1 Efforts to define terrorism in the legal doctrine and legislation, see: D. Jakovljevic, Terrorism from the Point of View of Criminal Law, Belgrade, 1997, pp. 21-26. 2 This is the known ITERATE methodology used in the statistical survey of terrorism. See: E. Micklous, Statistical Approaches to the Study of Terrorism. In: Terrorism Interdisciplinary Perspectives, by Alexander J. and Finger M., New York, 1978, pp. 209-211. 3 Compare: M. Pasanski, Technology of Political Terrorism (I), Security and DSZ, No. 6/1990, p. 32. 4 After the reform in 1981, UCIGOS developed into the Central Preventive Police Department (DCPP) within which there exists a separate Antiterrorism Service with three departments as well as the mentioned special antiterrorist unit (NOCS). 5 Incrimination of terrorism in the comparative law and legislative measures, see: D. Jakovljevic, ibid, pp. 127-170; A. Makra, Contemporary Terrorism, "13. maj", No. 1/1979, pp. 32-33; E.J.H. Moons: Approche politique et juridique du terrorisme et de la criminalite anarchisante en Republique federal alemande, Revue de droit penal et de criminologie, No. 5/78, 503-543); A.A. Spicek: Juridiceskaja otvetstvennost za sovrsenje aktov terrora po savremennomu burzuaznomu zakonodateljstvu, Pravovedenije, No. 4/1986, pp. 35-40. 6 Yonah Alexander, The Terrorist Network, "Defense and Diplomacy", No. 9, September 1989, pp. 36-41. 7 See more: S. Ovcinskij and others, Borba s organizovanoj prestupnostju, Moscow, 1996, pp. 24-26, G. Njardlanj, Linkages between the Illegal Drugs and Terrorism, Conflict Quarterly, No. 3/1988, pp. 5-26. 8 According to this Act, Mir Aimal Kansi and Timothy Mc Veigh were already sentenced to death for the murder of two CIA members and for planting a bomb in Oklahoma City respectively. 9 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) within the Federal Department of Justice is the main investigation instrument of the Department and its assignments include a wide spectrum of investigations of criminal offences committed in contravention of federal acts and some other affairs; however, its priorities include, inter alia, counterterrorism (internal terrorism, hostage taking, murders of US citizens in foreign countries, protection of foreign representatives and visiting officials, sabotages, internal security, bomb planting, incitement to rebellion). 10 On 15 July 1994, the District Court of Pristina sentenced 14 members of the so-called defence ministry of the "Kosovo Republic" to one to seven and a half years in prison. Following the instructions of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, they worked on the forming of an "Albanian army in Kosovo" from the second half of 1990. They received instructions from the leader of the Alliance, Anton Kolja, and from Albanian Defence Minister General Safet Zullalli. SURVEY OF TERRORIST ACTS COMMITTED IN KOSOVO AND METOHIJA IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1991 AND 25 JUNE 1998 199119921993199419951996199725.06.1998Total Total111286113155546680 Police officers and buildings11118371931204294 Buildings with refugees-----811322 Citizens and other buildings-1-34423329264 C O N S E Q U E N C E S Killed - total13256101270109 Police officers132-2412639 Citizens---546114470 Injured - total491229727142212 severe bodily injuries28112731587135 minor bodily injuries211-24125577 Police officers46121761388137 severe bodily injuries251115385590 minor bodily injuries211-2353347 Citizens-3-121145475 severe bodily injuries/3-12-73245 minor bodily injuries-----172230