>
>

>
>                  RUSSIAN VIEWS ON ELECTRONIC
>                    AND INFORMATION WARFARE:
>                            VOLUME I
>

>                                
>                                
>                                
>                                
>                                
>                                
>                               By
>                                
>                                
>                       Mary C. FitzGerald
>                        Research Fellow
>                                
>                         December 1996
>                                
>                
>                                
>                                
>1015 18th Street, N.W.   Suite 300   Washington, D.C.  20036   202-223-7770   FAX  202-223-8537
>                                
>                                
>                        Hudson Institute
>                                
>                                
>                                



>                             

  >
                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
>                                
>                                
>     In the early 1980s, the Soviet military was perhaps the first to argue that a new
>"revolution" was occurring in military affairs.  Today the Russian military argues that
>precision-guided, non-nuclear, deep-strike weapons and the systems used to integrate
>them are revolutionizing all aspects of military art and force structure -- and elevating
>combat capabilities on the order of 106.  According to the Russian military, superiority
>in the new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) proceeds from superiority in C4ISR
>systems:  1) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) systems, and
>2) "intelligent" command-and-control systems.  Information technologies are now said
>to be "the most formidable weapons of the 21st century" -- and comparable in effects
>to weapons of mass destruction.  Indeed they constitute the essence of the new, 4th
>RMA.  The Russian politico-military leadership is therefore engineering a dramatic
>shift away from material-intensive systems and toward science-intensive systems:
>away from ballistic missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, tanks, and artillery and
>toward advanced C4ISR and EW systems.
>

>     Under conditions of parity in nuclear and conventional weapons, superiority in
>reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic warfare is said to be the main
>factor in raising the qualitative indices of weapons and military equipment, which will
>have a "decisive" effect on the course and outcome of combat operations.  Under all
>circumstances the side that has advantages in these areas will always possess greater
>capabilities, even if the other side has definite advantages in nuclear and, even more
>so, conventional weapons.
>

>     The Russian military now argues that, as the most dramatic force multipliers,
>advanced C4ISR and EW systems must govern the allocation of scarce defense
>resources.  Civilians such as President Yel'tsin and Deputy Defense Minister A.
>Kokoshin -- head of the Military-Technical Policy Council -- have repeatedly echoed
>this assessment.  These systems represent the most cost-effective way to increase
>combat capabilities without increasing the quantity or even quality of weapons
>systems.  They must also be included in any equations involving combat potential in
>all future arms control negotiations; the crushing weight of these systems has negated
>the quantitative paradigm that formerly constituted the heart of such calculations. 
>Warfare has indeed shifted from being a duel of strike systems to being a duel of
>information systems.
>

>     The Russian military hierarchy clearly understands the strategic and tactical
>implications of the new RMA, and has developed a detailed planning framework for
>generating appropriate responses.  The need to spend a disproportionate share of
>scarce military resources on developing such responses is recognized by all senior
>military officers.  Notwithstanding the high priority assigned to the RMA, Russia is
>unlikely to possess the economic and technological resources to match the U.S. in
>advanced military technologies for at least 10-15 years.  This deficiency may force the
>General Staff to continue relying on more territorial, "brute-force" solutions to military
>challenges, most notably the employment of nuclear weapons.
>

>     But the current strategy of selective investment coupled with careful analysis of
>U.S. vulnerabilities could enable Russia to compete with and even surpass U.S. forces
>in specific operational niches -- such as information/electronic warfare -- long before
>the RMA is generalized throughout the Russian military.  Current U.S. military
>doctrine refers to such niche threats as "asymmetrical warfare."  The U.S.
>vulnerabilities that Russia has chosen to exploit are technological, doctrinal,
>organizational, and cultural.  Even when the vulnerabilities in question are not
>technological (e.g., American aversion to casualties), Russia may be able to use
>emerging military technologies to more fully exploit them.  Over the longer term, a
>restoration of economic vitality may enable the Russian military to "leapfrog" U.S.
>capabilities because many of the technologies in question involve dual-use
>applications that are readily available in global commerce.
>

>     Serious military reforms are more likely now that General Rodionov is defense
>minister.   His radical reform plan includes slashing the Ground Troops, altering
>defense budget priorities in favor of information and emerging technologies, and
>significantly delaying planned weapons procurement in order to expand the R&D
>base.  Unlike his predecessor, he is convinced that there is no alternative to radical
>reforms, and his acceptance of Russia's economic limitations will allow a better
>working relationship with other government officials.  While he faces an uphill battle,
>his planned reforms create the basis for a gradual increase in Russian military
>capabilities over the next decade. 
>

>     Russian military scientists note that they have fully developed the theory of
>information warfare, as well as the methodological foundations for conducting a future
>"reconnaissance-strike operation."  But "the pragmatic Americans," they say, "have
>undertaken the resolution of individual issues without having resolved general issues." 
>Indeed the U.S. government currently views Russia as a Third World country -- albeit
>with massive nuclear megatonnage.  This research provides a basis for a more
>prescient vision of the nature and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the 21st
>century -- especially in the sphere of information warfare.
>
                          INTRODUCTION
>

>          "The high effectiveness of  information warfare' systems, in
>     combination with highly accurate weapons and  non-military means of
>     influence,' make it possible to disorganize the system of state administration,
>     hit strategically important installations and groupings of forces, and affect the
>     mentality and moral spirit of the population.  In other words, the effect of
>     using these means is comparable with the damage resulting from the effect of
>     weapons of mass destruction." (General Viktor Samsonov, Chief of the
>     Russian General Staff, 23 December 1996)
>

>     Many Western analysts assume that during the next 15 years, only the United
>States has the capability to implement the new revolution in military affairs (RMA) --
>that only the U.S. military will be able to integrate all of its elements into a cohesive
>whole.  The question of what specific aspects of it other nations might obtain, when
>they might do so, and what implications that would hold for U.S. forces is an
>important one.  As a result, U.S. policy-makers can only benefit from analyzing the
>long-term vision of military powers such as Russia.
>           
>     In the early 1980s, the Soviet military was perhaps the first to argue that a new
>"revolution" was occurring in military affairs.  Today the Russians argue that
>precision-guided, non-nuclear, deep-strike weapons and the systems used to integrate
>them are revolutionizing all aspects of military art and force structure -- and elevating
>combat capabilities on the order of 106.  Russia's first official military doctrine,
>approved by President Yel'tsin and the Security Council in November 1993, clearly
>reflects the ongoing civil-military consensus on the nature and requirements of the new
>RMA.  The document directs that R&D efforts focus above all on the development of
>the new deep-strike weapons and advanced C4ISR/electronic warfare (EW) assets.
>

>     Despite the ongoing economic chaos in Russia, the Russian General Staff
>continues to plan for a future "air-space war." For the short term, they have explored
>sophisticated technical and operational countermeasures to the new technologies of the
>"air-space war."  For the long term, they have oriented much of their limited resources
>toward creating an infrastructure that ensures "rapid surge production" of these
>technologies as the situation warrants.  For the transitional period between the two,
>they have resurrected nuclear war-fighting to cope with a variety of worst-case
>scenarios.  Both civilian and military leaders agree that military-technical potential for
>competing in the RMA represents Russia's main guarantee for preserving its hard-won
>superpower status.
>

>     According to the Russian military, superiority in the RMA proceeds from
>superiority in "information warfare (IW)":  1) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target
>acquisition (RSTA) systems, and 2) "intelligent" command-and-control systems. There
>has clearly appeared a specific field -- information -- the gaining and holding of
>superiority in which can play the decisive role in the achievement of success by one
>of the opposing sides.  The "formula for success" in the modern battle or operation is
>approximately thus:  First gain superiority on the air waves, then in the air, and only
>then by troop operations.  This is compared with the fact that in World War II success
>depended largely on how successfully air superiority was gained, and in World War
>I on how effectively the fire resources of the troops themselves, and especially of the
>artillery, were used.
>

>     Thus, armed conflict today can be viewed as the aggregate of two components,
>electronic-fire and information, each of which has only the objects, resources, and
>methods inherent to it.  By the electronic-fire component of armed conflict the
>Russians mean that field which is defined by the capabilities of means of fire
>destruction and electronic warfare; i.e., of means capable of having a direct effect on
>enemy equipment and personnel.  The information component is understood to be the
>field defined by the capabilities of resources that provide for acquiring information
>(reconnaissance) and using it (command and control) in the interest of increasing the
>combat potential of the resources that have a direct effect on the enemy (fire
>destruction and electronic warfare resources).
>

>     Under conditions of parity in nuclear and conventional weapons, superiority in
>reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic warfare is said to be the main
>factor in raising the qualitative indices of weapons and military equipment, which will
>have a "decisive" effect on the course and outcome of combat operations.  Under all
>circumstances the side that has advantages in these areas will always possess greater
>capabilities, even if the other side has definite advantages in nuclear and, even more
>so, conventional weapons.
>

>     In the Russian view, the contribution to armed conflict of the information
>component, and of the main means of combatting it -- electronic warfare -- is
>becoming more and more important.  The idea about the appearance, along with
>conflict on land, at sea, and in the air and space, of a fourth realm -- information, to
>which all categories, concepts, and methods of military art extend -- is more and more
>taking shape.  The concept of "information warfare" is obtaining ever greater
>"citizenship rights," and gaining superiority in it is becoming a factor that determines
>the military-technical superiority of one side over the other.
>

>     These circumstances require that the capabilities of reconnaissance, command
>and control, and electronic warfare be taken into account in the generalized potentials
>of groupings of troops (forces, weapons, combat equipment) and, consequently, also
>be taken into account at disarmament negotiations, in determining parity of the sides. 
>Finally, determination of the military budget as a whole, as well as its distribution
>among individual directions for developing weapons and military equipment, must
>take into account the correlation of the combat potentials of the sides that is taking
>shape, and the contribution of each of the means of waging armed conflict to the
>generalized combat potential of troops (forces).  In the Russian view, the experience
>of exercises and local wars has demonstrated that the most advisable way of increasing
>combat capabilities (according to the cost-effectiveness criterion) is not increased
>numerical strength or kill capability of arms and military equipment, but their
>information support (outfitting with electronic systems and computers), above all for
>weapons and for EW, intelligence, and command-and-control systems and equipment.
>

>     An analysis of the Gulf War is said to demonstrate that owing to
>"intellectualization" of the precision weapons systems employed in this war -- i.e.,
>giving them elements of "logical deduction" -- an opportunity appeared to make
>decisions essentially in real time.  Because of sharply reduced time for the cycle of
>command and control both of weapons and personnel (excluding man as an
>intermediate element in evaluation-calculation operations of preparing variants of
>decisions and of command and control), this considerably increased their effectiveness
>and reduced the number of servicemen.  Confirmation of this is said to be the rather
>effective battle, demonstrated for the first time, of Patriot surface-to-air missile systems
>against Scud missiles, which today forces one to take a quite different look at the
>significance of ABM defense.  Various automated combat support equipment,
>complexes, and systems managed to be integrated into a common intelligence and
>command-and-control system in this war, also thanks to "intellectualization."  Its high
>combat capabilities were convincingly proven by the successes of Desert Storm.
>

>     In short, Russian experts argue that the development and adoption of intelligent
>command-and-control systems elevate command and control of forces and weapons
>to a new level both in peacetime as well as war.  They will be economical and will
>permit finding necessary solutions and determining necessary personnel and
>equipment for achieving objectives without an actual costly, multi-variant practical
>check.  In the Russian view, swift expansion of work on this problem is extremely
>necessary in view of the reduction in defense expenditures and can contribute to the
>development of new, highly effective technical equipment and technologies.
>

>     The Russian military argues that EW has become a form of the offense against
>precision weapons and advanced C4ISR systems.  It is capable of achieving surprise
>by "blinding" the electronic equipment of reconnaissance and air defense systems.  It
>is also capable of thwarting the enemy's surprise because it acts instantaneously over
>great distances; i.e., earlier than enemy firepower.  Finally, EW can decrease the
>effectiveness of deep strikes during air-land operations by disrupting both the control
>of missile systems and the coordination between ground forces and aviation.  In the
>Russian view, EW training has become a necessary element at all levels of military
>art, and it is now legitimate to speak of the creation of a new combat arm -- the EW
>Troops.
>

>     The Russian military now argues that, as the most dramatic force multipliers,
>advanced C4ISR and EW systems must govern the allocation of scarce defense
>resources.  Civilians such as President Yel'tsin and Deputy Defense Minister A.
>Kokoshin -- head of the Military-Technical Policy Council -- have repeatedly echoed
>this assessment.  These systems represent the most cost-effective way to increase
>combat capabilities without increasing the quantity or even quality of weapons
>systems.  They must also be included in any equations involving combat potential in
>all future arms control negotiations; the crushing weight of these systems has negated
>the quantitative paradigm that formerly constituted the heart of such calculations. 
>Warfare has indeed shifted from being a duel of strike systems to being a duel of
>information systems.
>

>     The Russian military hierarchy clearly understands the strategic and tactical
>implications of the new RMA, and has developed a detailed planning framework for
>generating appropriate responses.  The need to spend a disproportionate share of
>scarce military resources on developing such responses is recognized by all senior
>military officers.  Notwithstanding the high priority assigned to the RMA, Russia is
>unlikely to possess the economic and technological resources to match the U.S. in
>advanced military technologies for at least 10-15 years.  This deficiency may force the
>General Staff to continue relying on more territorial, "brute-force" solutions to military
>challenges, most notably the employment of nuclear weapons.
>

>     But the current strategy of selective investment coupled with careful analysis of
>U.S. vulnerabilities could enable Russia to compete with and even surpass U.S. forces
>in specific operational niches -- such as information/electronic warfare -- long before
>the RMA is generalized throughout the Russian military.  Current U.S. military
>doctrine refers to such niche threats as "asymmetrical warfare."  The U.S.
>vulnerabilities that Russia has chosen to exploit are technological, doctrinal,
>organizational, and cultural.  Even when the vulnerabilities in question are not
>technological (e.g., American aversion to casualties), Russia may be able to use
>emerging military technologies to more fully exploit them.  Over the longer term, a
>restoration of economic vitality may enable the Russian military to "leapfrog" U.S.
>capabilities because many of the technologies in question involve dual-use
>applications that are readily available in global commerce.
>

>     Serious military reforms are more likely now that General Rodionov is defense
>minister.   His radical reform plan includes slashing the Ground Troops, altering
>defense budget priorities in favor of information and emerging technologies, and
>significantly delaying planned weapons procurement in order to expand the R&D
>base.  Unlike his predecessor, he is convinced that there is no alternative to radical
>reforms, and his acceptance of Russia's economic limitations will allow a better
>working relationship with other government officials.  While he faces an uphill battle,
>his planned reforms create the basis for a gradual increase in Russian military
>capabilities over the next decade. 
>

>     The U.S. government currently views Russia as a Third World country -- albeit
>with massive nuclear megatonnage.  This research provides a basis for a more
>prescient vision of the nature and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the 21st
>century -- especially in the sphere of information warfare.   
                     KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS
>                                
>NATURE OF INFORMATION WARFARE (IW)
>     Russian military scientists assert that IW has three components that encompass
>the totality of actions which ensure victory over the opponent in the information
>sphere.  The first component is the complex of measures for acquiring information on
>the opponent and the conditions of the conflict (radioelectronic, meteorological, the
>engineering situation, etc.); the collection of information on his troops; and the
>processing of information and its exchange between command-and-control organs
>(points) in order to organize and conduct combat actions.  Information must be
>reliable, precise, and complete, and its transmission must be selective and timely.  A
>logical name for these tasks is "information support of troop and weapon control."
>

>     The second component of IW is opposition to the information support of the
>opponent's troop and weapon control ("information opposition").  It includes measures
>to block the acquisition, processing, and exchange of information as well as the
>insertion of disinformation at all levels of the information support of the opponent's
>troop and weapon control.
>

>     The third component consists of measures to defend against the opponent's
>information opposition ("information defense"), which includes actions to unblock
>information required for fulfilling the tasks of control, and to block disinformation
>disseminated and inserted into the control system.  Information defense enhances the
>effectiveness of information support under conditions of the opponent's information
>opposition (see Figure 1).
>

>     The ultimate objective of IW is to achieve information dominance over the
>opponent; i.e., a situation wherein the information quotient of one's own troop and
>weapon control organs is more complete, precise, reliable, and timely than that of the
>opponent's corresponding control organs.  Thus, the Russians define information
>warfare as a complex of measures for information support, information opposition, and
>information defense conducted according to a single concept and plan in order to seize
>and maintain information dominance over the opponent in the preparation and course
>of combat actions.
>

>     According to Russian military scientists, the essence of the new, 4th RMA is
>victory in information warfare.  The United States calls this component different
>things:  information struggle, information war, warfare against enemy command-and-control entities, etc.  It is based on use of existing U.S. superiority in the spheres of
>communications, cybernetics, and information science; in modern methods of
>collecting, gathering, and analyzing intelligence; in processing and transmitting data
>at a high rate; and in the methodology of modeling; i.e., on superiority in information
>systems, which permits destroying the enemy battle management system architecture
>while preserving their own battle management systems.  Russian experts thus argue
>that information weapons are a 21st-century weapon capable of replacing today's
>weapons of mass destruction. 
>

>     The ideas and material foundations of information weapons were formed
>simultaneously with the development of society's information environment. 
>Computerization of various spheres of public life, electronic communications,
>databases and data banks, the latest information technologies, and the transformation
>of programming into a prestigious and mass specialty created the basic scientific,
>technological, and economic prerequisites for the emergence of a new type of
>information weapon, and at the same time made command and control,
>communications, power engineering, transportation facilities, and the banking system
>quite vulnerable with regard to the information effect.  "American experts" list the
>following information effect attack systems:
>

>     a) computer viruses that can multiply and attach themselves to programs, be
>     transmitted via communications lines and data-transmission networks, and
>     penetrate electronic telephone exchanges and command-and-control systems
>     and disable them;
>

>     b) logic bombs, so-called applications software that have previously been
>     introduced into the information and command-and-control centers of the
>     military and civilian infrastructure that are activated according to a signal or at
>     a prescribed time and destroy or distort information or disrupt the operation of
>     hardware or software systems.  One of the varieties of this bomb -- the "Trojan
>     Horse" -- is a program that permits one to carry out hidden unsanctioned access
>     to enemy information resources to extract intelligence information;
>

>     c) systems to suppress the exchange of information in telecommunications
>     networks, its falsification, and the transmission of needed information (from the
>     position of the opposing side) via state and military command-and-control
>     channels, and also via mass media channels; and
>

>     d) techniques and systems that permit the introduction of computer viruses and
>     logic bombs into state and corporate information networks and systems and
>     their remote control (from the introduction of microprocessors and other
>     components into electronic devices sold on the world market to international
>     information networks and systems that are managed by NATO and the United
>     States).
>

>     The facilities that are most vulnerable to these systems are those that must
>maintain an uninterrupted capacity to operate or function in real time.  Based upon the
>assessments of "foreign experts," the probability of the restoration of automated air-space attack early-warning systems, anti-ballistic missile command-and-control
>systems, and other strategic systems is sufficiently low so that the results of purposeful
>interference in their operation could be catastrophic in nature and comparable in
>possible damage with the consequences of the employment of nuclear weapons.
>

>     A sober assessment is needed of today's situation and of the specific features
>and prospects for the development of information weapons and the techniques for their
>employment.  That assessment is the basic prerequisite for the development of
>Russia's foreign and domestic policy, the military and military-technical components
>of which could prevent or counter threats that have arisen and reliably guarantee the
>country's security.  In the process, it is important to understand that the threat of
>information warfare in a broad context is a factor of latent military-political pressure
>and, possibly, intimidation, a factor that is capable of disrupting strategic parity and
>undermining the balance of the two great powers that has taken shape on the world
>political scene.  That is why monitoring threats of the employment of information
>weapons and the permanent assessment of the effectiveness of the functioning of
>systems to counteract these weapons must be carried out on such a broad scale.
>

>     A natural reaction to the appearance of a new high-technology weapon is the
>development of adequate countermeasures.  This must be a question not only of
>technologies for the detection of the effects of information weapons but also some kind
>of "early-warning systems."  Further, Russia must provide for the continuous
>improvement and development of hardware and software methods to prevent the loss,
>damage, destruction, distortion, or interception of information, including the exclusion
>of unsanctioned access to it and cryptographic information protection systems during
>transmission via communications channels.  In general, it is possible to directly
>counter the effect of information weapons using hardware and software methods. 
>These methods must be supplemented by information weapons counter-control
>methods and also by varied legal and organizational-economic measures directed at
>the protection of state information resources.
>

>     The experts also assert that Russia needs to intensify the development of its own
>information weapons as an integral part of weapons and military equipment.  The
>security of the state requires the leveling of the correlation of forces for information
>weapons: the probable enemy must know that he himself is vulnerable.
>

>     And, according to the Russians, this is only the beginning.  The possibilities of
>information war are increasing in response to the improvement and spread of micro-processors, high-speed data-receiving and processing systems, and sophisticated
>sensors -- powerful weapons in the hands of those who know how to use them. 
>Various specific means will be used actively in information war, above all software
>products -- computer viruses, logic bombs, computer "chips" -- which, installed in
>weapons supplied to a probable enemy, will make them ineffective while appearing
>reliable outwardly.  It is also proposed to use explosive devices producing a powerful
>EMP (such devices, the size of an ordinary suitcase, already have been created at Los
>Alamos National Laboratory), and even biological agents, particularly a special kind
>of microbes capable of destroying electronic circuits and insulating materials. 
>Although information war may precede or replace combat operations, the methods and
>equipment used in its course significantly increase troop capabilities and compensate
>for a shortage of conventional forces and arms. 
>

>     Soviet/Russian experts stress that the enhanced effectiveness of weaponry
>resulting from its "intellectualization" underlies many of the current, revolutionary
>changes in military affairs.  The very first phase of "intellectualization" should lead to
>a radical transformation of weapons systems and methods of their use.  The next
>phase, in which automation encompasses the decision-making processes involved in
>using weapons, could generate radical changes in the organizational principles of
>armed forces.  It will robotize the battlefield and dramatically lower the numerical
>requirements of armed forces while dictating much higher training requirements. 
>Changes in the structure and functions of different branches of the armed forces will
>probably occur during this phase.
>

>     In the "intellectualization" arms race, competition might not take the form of the
>quantitative accumulation of arsenals, but of the augmentation of the possible varieties
>of programmed behavior in weapons systems; i.e., the accumulation of intellectual
>potential "isolated" in a programmed product.  The arms race is moving into the sphere
>of software:  the richer the variety of possible forms of behavior by self-contained
>systems or of premeditated alternative decisions, the more effectively the warring army
>can use its resources.  As a result, the incorporation of information sciences into the
>military sphere will not merely change the specifications and performance
>characteristics of weapons, but will create a new military-political situation differing
>radically from that which existed when the "intellectualization" of weapons had just
>begun.
>

>     According to the Russian military, superiority in the RMA proceeds from
>superiority in C4ISR systems:  1) reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
>(RSTA) systems, and 2) "intelligent" command-and-control systems.  The "formula
>for success" in the modern battle or operation is approximately thus:  First gain
>superiority on the air waves, then in the air, and only then by troop operations.  This
>is compared with the fact that in World War II success depended largely on how
>successfully air superiority was gained, and in World War I on how effectively the fire
>resources of the troops themselves, and especially of the artillery, were used.
>

>     Thus, armed conflict today can be viewed as the aggregate of two components,
>electronic-fire and information, each of which has only the objects, resources, and
>methods inherent to it.  By the electronic-fire component of armed conflict they mean
>the field which is defined by the capabilities of means of fire destruction and electronic
>warfare; i.e., of means capable of having a direct effect on enemy equipment and
>personnel.  The information component is understood to be the field defined by the
>capabilities of resources that provide for acquiring information (reconnaissance) and
>using it (command and control) in the interest of increasing the combat potential of the
>resources that have a direct effect on the enemy (fire destruction and electronic warfare
>resources).
>

>     Under conditions of parity in nuclear and conventional weapons, superiority in
>reconnaissance, command and control, and electronic warfare is today the main factor
>in raising the qualitative indices of weapons and military equipment, which can have
>a "decisive" effect on the course and outcome of combat operations.  Under all
>circumstances the side that has advantages in reconnaissance, command and control,
>and electronic warfare will always possess greater capabilities, even if the other side
>has definite advantages in nuclear and, even more so, conventional weapons.
>

>     These circumstances require that the capabilities of reconnaissance, command
>and control, and electronic warfare be taken into account in the generalized potentials
>of groupings of troops (forces, weapons, combat equipment) and, consequently, also
>be taken into account at disarmament negotiations, in determining parity of the sides. 
>Finally, determination of the military budget as a whole, as well as its distribution
>among individual directions for developing weapons and military equipment, must
>take into account the correlation of the combat potentials of the sides that is taking
>shape, and the contribution of each of the means of waging armed conflict to the
>generalized combat potential of troops (forces).  The experience of exercises and local
>wars has demonstrated that the most advisable way of increasing combat capabilities
>(according to the cost-effectiveness criterion) is not increased numerical strength or kill
>capability of arms and military equipment, but their information support (outfitting
>with electronic systems and computers), above all for weapons and for EW,
>intelligence, and command-and-control systems and equipment.
>

>     A new power deterrence factor -- the threat of inflicting irreparable damage on
>a particular country's information resources -- is therefore forming in the system of
>confrontation of new geopolitical associations of states.  This can be done overtly or
>covertly, in the form of information opposition.  The most complicated form of such
>aggression is to control the decision-making process in state structures under the effect
>of specific information or disinformation.  The following types of information
>subversion can occur:  disrupting the information exchange procedure and illegally
>using and collecting information;  having unsanctioned access to information
>resources; manipulating information (disinformation, its concealment or its distortion);
>illegal copying of data from information systems; and theft of information from data
>bases and banks.
>

>     For sides possessing more developed information resources, the losses also will
>be more appreciable in case of large-scale use of means of special software damage. 
>This is why, in assessing the possibilities of deterring a probable aggressor with the
>threat of retaliatory nuclear and conventional damage, the possibilities of information
>damage; i.e., of a special software engineering effect on the enemy, also must be borne
>in mind.  It is this factor that may become a deterrent to the initiation both of a nuclear
>as well as of an information war.  Thus, the development of information means of
>warfare becomes an additional guarantee of peace and of development of cooperation
>among countries for strengthening military-strategic stability.  But this in no way
>means that the military threat has been eliminated.  This is why, in developing the
>Russian military reform concept, it is also necessary to take into account new methods
>of waging a quiet (information) war.
>

>     Achievements in the spheres of communications, cybernetics,  and information
>science as applied to new methods of collecting, processing, and rapidly
>communicating intelligence to forces; in the methodology and methods of
>computerized simulation of the situation and operations; in the field of crypto-analysis
>and so on have generated such new concepts in modern military affairs as "information
>war."  The concept of information war is to show a potential enemy superiority in
>intelligence and in the capability of blinding, deafening, demoralizing, and
>decapitating the command-and-control system of its armed forces and of the state as
>a whole, and in the ability to neutralize his computer equipment and communications
>assets, disrupt information processes, and destroy information systems and resources
>"at global distances and with the speed of light."  This is supposed to induce a
>probable enemy to reject war, having understood its lack of prospect for himself.  If
>intimidation does not work, use all available means en masse for victory.  In other
>words, achieve your goals:
>

>          in peacetime by electronic intimidation;
>          in a period of threat by a use of electronic means against military and
>          civilian information and command-and-control structures that is selective
>          in terms of targets but massive in terms of intensity; and 
>          during a military conflict by massive use both of electronic as well as of
>          fire-delivery means against all systems of the aforementioned targets.
>

>     A particular kind of information war is the destruction by "nonlethal weapons"
>(electronic weapons) of the most important elements of military industry and the
>civilian regional infrastructure by disabling, for example, power supply,
>communications, transportation, and other installations.  But information warfare, and
>above all warfare against command-and-control systems (IW/C2W), has two main
>goals:
>

>          offensive -- to deceive, disorganize, or destroy the enemy information
>          infrastructure; to confuse, disorganize, or totally disrupt the process of
>          operational command and control of his forces and assets for rapid
>          neutralization of resistance;
>

>          defensive -- to protect the friendly information infrastructure and the
>          command-and-control process against enemy effect.
>

>     Making simultaneous and maximum possible use of all means and methods of
>warfare in their close interaction for achieving the highest results and concentrating
>main efforts on destroying the most important vulnerable links of the enemy
>information infrastructure and command-and-control system are a guarantee of success
>here.  Radars, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment, communications centers
>and lines, transmitting and receiving components of communications centers, radio-relay stations, fixed navigational equipment, television and radio broadcasting
>stations, and so on can be included among vulnerable links of the information
>infrastructure.  Other vulnerable links are elements of the support infrastructure --
>electrical power stations, power supply lines, and so on.  
>

>     Critically important vulnerable links include the most important components of
>the command-and-control system, the destruction or annihilation of which will entail
>an immediate decrease in capabilities for command and control of troops and forces
>and for effective conduct of combat operations.  They include military and civilian
>command-and-control entities at all levels with their electronic equipment (electronic
>computers, automated control systems, electronic data bases communications systems,
>situation display systems, and so on), and satellite surveillance, reconnaissance,
>communications, and navigation systems.  Imagine the chaos that would arise as a
>result of a shutdown of computers and technical and information systems serving, for
>example, a city's municipal economy.
>

>     The Russians describe five aspects of IW/C2W.  Deception is an element of
>stratagem which "controls" the enemy by creating a false impression in him of the
>actual situation and status of forces opposing him and about the concept, time periods,
>and nature of their operations, forcing him to act in a predictable manner unfavorable
>to himself. 
>

>     Operations security is a disruption of enemy efforts to diminish the effectiveness
>of operations by opposing forces.  Added here to various methods of protecting
>friendly information systems are measures for countering enemy intelligence,
>maskirovka,  secrecy of the operational concept, electronic countermeasures, delivery
>of fire, and so on.  Methods of psychological operations in information warfare include
>praising one's own way of life; intimidating servicemen and the population of the
>enemy country by the might of one's war machine; undermining their faith in their own
>military and civilian leaders; sowing dissatisfaction and psychosis; inciting
>disobedience, desertion, and surrender; and fanning defeatist and capitulationist
>sentiments. 
>

>     The final aspect of IW/C2W is destruction.  By 2000 one can expect the
>appearance of a so-called remote virus weapon against computers.  This computer
>virus, such as in the form of automatic and controlled software inserts and interference,
>will be introduced via radio channels and laser communications links between central
>computers and user terminals.  One hardly can overestimate the danger of a remote
>virus weapon to automated control systems and above all to command and control of
>strategic missile complexes.  While destruction is achieved now basically by fire-delivery weapons, in the near future it will be done more and more with electronic
>means.
>

>     The Russians also assert that SHF-generators ("microwave weapons"), intended
>for disabling space-based, airborne, ground-based, and sea-based electronic gear by
>means of a powerful, directed-effect electromagnetic pulse, will become a new means
>of warfare against command-and-control, communications, computer support, and
>intelligence systems by 2005-2010.  Depending on type and location, the effective
>casualty zone of such generators will vary from several hundreds of meters for a cruise
>missile to several tens of kilometers for heavier platforms.  Figuratively speaking, such
>selective and massive electronic and fire strikes will achieve paralysis of the enemy
>nervous system -- his brain, nerves, and organs of sense; i.e., the command-and-control, communications, computer support, and intelligence systems.
>

>     The Russians argue that information war occupies a position between a "cold"
>war, which includes in particular economic war, and a "hot" war.  In contrast to an
>economic war, the result of an information war is actual disrupted functioning of
>elements of the enemy infrastructure (command-and-control facilities, missile and
>launch positions, airfields, ports, communications systems, depots, and so on.  In
>contrast to a "hot" war with the use of conventional and/or mass destruction weapons,
>it is aimed not at material, but at "theoretical" objects, symbolic  systems, or their
>physical media.  At the same time, such objects and systems can be destroyed while
>their material basis is preserved.
>

>INFORMATION SECURITY
>     According to Russian military scientists, the following substantial groups of
>information and technical dangers can be singled out.  The first group is related to the
>rapid development of a new class of weapons -- information weapons -- which are
>capable of effectively influencing both people's consciousness and psychology and also
>the informational and technical infrastructure of society and the army.  At the present
>time many new means have been created to produce an impact on people's minds and
>to manipulate their behavior.  According to foreign sources, no methods have yet been
>found to exercise a steady and predictable direction of people's collective behavior. 
>Yet such research programs are being conducted.  Periodically reports appear in the
>press about the U.S. MK-Ultra program and also analogous programs in France,
>Japan, and other countries.  Achievements in this field are such that it is already
>possible to talk about the effectiveness of "zombifying" (programming the behavior
>and activity of) particular  individuals.  For this purpose not only pharmacological
>means but also psychotropic generators have been created and are being used.
>

>     According to Russian military scientists, states with a well-developed
>information science sphere are preparing for a computer war and developing and
>testing methods of affecting computer systems.  There is no question that the
>effectiveness of computer counteraction will be fairly high.  This is evidenced by the
>fact that Iraq could not use the air defense systems bought in France against the MNF. 
>Their software contained logic bombs that were activated with the start of hostilities. 
>The use of such a bomb or a virus will apparently be capable of producing the same
>results as conventional bombing of a state administrative body or a combat control
>post (center).  Therefore attempts will be made to mine all state administration and
>military computer systems (primarily all valuable systems and networks) with logic
>bombs and infect them with viruses waiting for their ultimate hour.  Information
>terrorism is also bound to appear.  It is therefore necessary that Russia make special
>preparations for all of this and provide for countermeasures.
>

>     Along similar lines, Rossiyskaya gazeta announced in 1995 that Russia is
>turning into a state which is utterly defenseless in the face of the use of "information
>weapons": imported technology and foreign-made communications systems in state-run and financial-and-industrial entities pose a real threat to the country's security. 
>In order to get out of the situation, the Russian government has decided to reduce to
>the minimum the import of communications systems and combine the efforts of
>Russia's competent agencies.
>

>     The growing role of information-technology warfare is rapidly lowering the
>barrier between war and peace.  The armed forces of likely adversaries are in a state
>of constant information warfare, and military informatics works to accomplish tasks
>characteristic of war even in peacetime.  Electronic warfare is being waged
>continuously.  A war of computer networks is now beginning.  An exchange of
>information strikes is becoming increasingly dangerous for the fate of peace, since the
>effectiveness of such strikes is rapidly increasing and it is extremely difficult to
>identify their sources.
>

>     Sources of information threats are divided into natural sources (objective
>sources that are not dependent on human will) and intentional.  Intentional information
>effects are caused deliberately and with specific purposes in mind.  This often involves
>the use of electronic news media, electronic warfare, special programs, computer
>"bombs," and so on.  These techniques are so effective that one can speak of a new
>class of weapons -- information weapons.
>

>     The second type of information threat involves the introduction and input of
>false data.  Information security in this field is provided by special structures that are 
>charged with waging information-technology warfare and that neutralize
>disinformation-technology, foil attempts to manipulate public opinion, counter
>electronic warfare, and eliminate the effects of computer attacks.
>

>     Computer viruses can be divided into several types, depending on how they
>operate.  The "Trojan horse virus" is introduced in the "victim" system, remains idle
>for a certain period of time, and then causes catastrophic destruction of the system (for
>example, a missile guidance system) or network into which it has been introduced.
>

>     The "forced quarantine" virus is introduced into a network and knocks out the
>program of the unit into which it was planted.  In order to prevent the destruction of
>the entire system, its components have to be separated.  Consequently, if an automated
>communication link network is attacked, it is immediately destroyed, and
>communication between its components is disrupted.
>

>     As concerns the "overload" virus, the clinical picture is different.  This "virus"
>quickly spreads throughout the entire system and gradually slows its operation.  The 
>"sensor" virus penetrates a preplanned sector of a computer's data-storage area and,
>at a critical moment, destroys the data bank and its information.
>

>     According to Russian military experts, information security in automated
>control systems is acquiring paramount importance at the present time.  Laws "On
>Legal Security of Computer Programs and Data Bases" and "On Copyright and
>Related Rights" adopted by the State Duma unfortunately only partially solve the
>problem of protection against "computer piracy," and they especially do not guard
>against unsanctioned access to information in military computer networks.
>

>INFORMATION WARFARE LESSONS FROM DESERT STORM
>     Russian experts stress above all the use of electronic warfare systems in MNF
>combat operations in Iraq.  They remain awestruck by the duration of the electronic
>phase, the quantity of systems employed, the simultaneity of effect on Iraqi C2 at all
>levels, and the synergism of EW and fire strikes.  It was the availability of powerful
>electronic warfare means, as well as their effective usage against Iraqi  electronic
>means, that reliably ensured MNF operations in the air and on the ground.   In practice
>the MNF conducted combat operations against an enemy whose control systems had
>been effectively disorganized.  Suffice it to say that spectral hardness of intended
>interference in some cases reached 4000 w/me and more, which excluded the use of
>Iraqi air defense radars and ultra-short wave communication systems.
>

>     The Russians come to the following tentative conclusions regarding the Gulf
>War:
>

>     1.  The modern "electronic-fire" concept of combat operations was demonstrated
>once again.  Operations aimed at ensuring superiority over the enemy in
>reconnaissance, control, and electronic warfare constituted its basis.  Radical changes
>in the nature of the armed struggle are becoming more and more obvious.  During this
>struggle the superiority in information of one side over another becomes the
>indispensable factor ensuring victory.  The concept "information war" increasingly
>acquires real meaning.  One can trace a historic law of ensuring success in combat
>operations.  In World War I it was achieved by superiority in fire means of troops
>(forces), first of all in artillery ("fire superiority").  In World War II, as well as in the
>local wars of the fifties and  beginning of the sixties (Vietnam, Korea) it was achieved
>by superiority in the means of air attack (gaining of "air supremacy").  Today's reality
>is actions aimed at gaining superiority over the enemy by disabling control systems
>and means, or "gaining of radio and electronic superiority", because now the basis of
>armaments and military equipment is electronic means and systems.  
>

>     Thus, in order to succeed in modern combat operations, it is necessary above all
>to gain "radio and electronic superiority" during fighting, then to obtain "air
>superiority" and "fire superiority", and after that to engage troops to seize the enemy's
>territory.  Taking into account the destructive capabilities of modern weapons, combat
>operations without these measures will always be characterized by heavy losses in
>personnel and materiel.
>

>     2.  The success of the MNF in many respects was achieved by the effectiveness
>of disorganizing the enemy's control of troops and weapons, which was conditioned
>by punctual organization of a complex employment of reconnaissance forces, main
>attack forces, and electronic warfare means based upon a wide-scale use of automated
>control systems.  Today actions against the enemy's reconnaissance and control of
>troops and weapons, as well as protection of one's own troops against the enemy's
>high-precision weapons and radio interference are becoming the most important tasks
>of forces. 
>

>     3.  The primary importance of electronic warfare forces and means in the armed
>struggle -- as the main component of the struggle for superiority over the enemy --
>proved correct.  This principle manifested itself particularly in the struggle between
>air forces and air defense, which was the essence of combat operations in the initial
>period of the war.  The availability of a large number of different types of electronic
>warfare means required punctual coordination between them in the interest of ensuring
>their massive use in the decisive stage of combat operations.  The corroboration of this
>is the coordination of the operations of electronic warfare means of the MNF ground
>and air force groupings in time, place, and object of actions, which ensured reliable
>neutralization of the electronic means of Iraqi air defense systems. 
>

>     4.  The level of electronic countermeasures of air defense EW means becomes
>the factor that will determine their combat stability and combat employment
>effectiveness.  Special importance is attached to such air defense countermeasures as
>multifrequency of the employed electronic means; the capability to counteract the
>enemy's interference; the availability and organization of reconnaissance and
>destructive means based on the use of various physical principles; and the integration
>of electronic warfare units into air defense groupings, their rational deployment and
>use in operational formations of air defense forces, etc.
>

>NEW C4ISR SYSTEMS AND CONCEPTS
>     According to Soviet/Russian military scientists, the new RMA dictated a
>re-examination of C3I systems, and a quest to develop an automated "control system"
>that will optimize the employment of forces according to the projected nature of future
>war.  The logical result will be changes in the methods of armed combat. Soviet
>experts predicted that forms of forcible confrontation and pressure will be replaced by
>flexible and maneuverable forms and a return to the "blitzkrieg" concept.  The
>"intellectualization" of weapons will magnify the ability of warring armies to
>concentrate their forces in certain maneuvers or to use them selectively and with the
>highest precision.  This ability will be achieved by the "intellectualization" of all levels
>of command and control -- from self-contained weapons systems to decision-making
>systems on all levels.  The increase in artificial intelligence (controllability) allows
>relatively small forces to achieve their objectives.
>

>     Information technologies have become one of the main criteria for the modernity
>of armed forces.  They are acquiring special significance because an intense struggle
>for more effective information support is being waged in the sphere of command-and-control systems.  The struggle is bloodless at first glance, primarily in the spheres of
>equipping troops with technical C3I systems and improving organizational structures
>and personnel training of command-and-control posts.  In fact, however, judging by
>the Persian Gulf conflict, lagging behind in the sphere of command and control in
>modern war is fraught with great losses.
>

>     According to the Russian military, warfare has shifted from being a duel of
>strike systems to being a duel of information systems.  As a result, military experts
>have repeatedly discussed current possibilities for developing "intelligent" C3I systems
>in order to elevate the combat potential of the post-Soviet Air Force and Air Defense
>Troops.  Along with the development of offensive air-space weapons which are being
>created with new technologies, the United States and NATO are said to be paying
>special attention to systems for command and control of forces and weapons.  Mass
>production of precision weapons leads to intensification of instability and the
>temptation, in case of war, to use them to destroy strategic nuclear forces and other
>very important installations by a preemptive mass attack using only conventional
>weapons.  The time factor acquires decisive importance under these conditions, which
>is especially important in connection with the fact that it is proposed to involve
>essentially all branches of the armed forces and combat arms in modern strategic
>operations.  This in turn requires appropriate processing and transmission of an
>enormous volume of various data in extremely limited time periods exceeding the
>capabilities of existing command-and-control systems.
>

>     According to Russian military scientists, modern conditions are characterized
>by a significant growth in the extent and content of command-and-control missions
>and consequently also of information support to command-and-control systems.  In
>addition, there is a persistent striving to achieve information dominance over the
>enemy by creating reconnaissance, command-and-control, and information systems
>based on the latest information technologies.  This tendency is especially pertinent
>under present conditions, when the struggle against battle management systems
>becomes one of the priority missions in warfare.  In this connection a new concept --
>"information weapon" -- has appeared in military terminology, the essence of which
>is the effect not only on military, but also on state command-and-control system
>information flows to disrupt stability of command and control.
>

>     The principal problem in organizing information support to modern command-and-control systems is to resolve the contradiction between the increased volume of
>necessary information and the constant demand to reduce its processing time.  This is
>what determines tendencies in the development of these systems, including automated
>systems.
>

>     Military specialists now give ever-greater attention to "electronization" of
>command-and-control systems and outfitting them with mutually tied-in technical
>complexes intended for assisting commanders and other officials in accomplishing
>command-and-control and combat missions.  Command-and-control systems more
>and more are becoming "man-machine" systems, since some functions are placed fully
>on technical equipment.  The form of the information medium essentially is changing
>and missions are arising connected with the following:  determining the limits of the
>information space in which a command-and-control system is operating; classifying
>and optimizing it; and developing forms and methods of its description and
>presentation necessary for the subsequent creation of automated and even conventional
>information systems.
>

>     For the purpose of making a detailed measurement of the effectiveness (MOE)
>of the command and control of troops, it is important to find out the essence of
>particular requirements ensuring its high effectiveness.  The main requirements
>include stability, promptness, continuity, and undetectability.  At the same time it is
>taken for granted  that command and control must, of course, be of high quality.  These
>requirements are sometimes interpreted as qualities of command-and-control systems.
>

>     Traditionally, command-and-control MOEs are divided into combat (external)
>and inherent (internal) ones.  The combat MOEs are based on the use of combat
>effectiveness indicators of troop activities that are determined by mathematical models. 
>Since the effectiveness of combat operations depends on the strength of the sides'
>troops and the effectiveness of their command and control, the following technique is
>usually applied in order to find out which of the methods of command and control
>employed within one command-and-control pattern or system has greater advantages:
>by assessing the command-and-control method used by the enemy troops it is possible
>to determine their strength and missions and, subsequently, the MOEs of combat
>operations that are in line with various command-and-control methods or systems are
>compared.  For instance, if a mathematical model of a frontal offensive or
>counteroffensive operation shows that by the 10th day of the operation the advance
>movement of the front troops was 260 km under an automated command-and-control
>system and 200 km without it, by comparing these figures one may draw a conclusion
>that the introduction of an automated command-and-control system in this particular
>example helped raise the effectiveness of combat operations by 30 percent.  These
>calculations have been fairly widespread in the Air Defense Troops and other
>branches.
>

>     Without denying the usefulness of such approaches, Russian military scientists 
>note that they point to a relative influence of efforts to perfect the command-and-control system while making it impossible to assess its essence; that is, to establish
>to what degree it corresponds to its missions.  What is used for this purpose are
>measures of one's own effectiveness of command and control of troops.  At the same
>time, the main measure of effectiveness of command and control of troops in
>operations should be interpreted as the degree of utilization by a command-and-control
>system of troop combat capabilities.  This MOE can materialize only by using the
>appropriate models of combat actions and carefully taking into account the role that
>the command-and-control systems of the two sides have to play.
>

>     Disruption is now one of the most important operational tasks of troops.  It is
>a mandatory condition for scoring success in a defensive (offensive) operation,
>especially in the initial period of war.  The experience of local wars and military
>conflicts of recent times (primarily in the Persian Gulf zone) attest to the fact that a
>modern war on any scale begins by solving the task of disrupting state and military
>control.  It is unequalled for its combat effectiveness and contributes in a big way to
>reducing enemy combat capabilities.  This success is, however, temporary (it lasts as
>long as it takes to restore the command and control).  Therefore it is necessary to strike
>blows at troops to consolidate it and to thereby change the correlation of forces in
>one's own favor.
>

>     These circumstances predetermine the general scenario for a possible
>development of war, especially of its initial period.  It starts with an active struggle by
>the sides to win superiority in command and control through, among other things,
>launching a special disruption operation or massive delivery of fire or electronic
>attacks.  The winning of supremacy in the air (outer space) will amount in this
>struggle to exploiting success, and only then will fighting start on land and sea.
>

>     Russian experts stress that information warfare is now assuming a priority
>importance that necessitates research and practical measures to create intellectual
>command-and-control systems (ICCS) on various levels that are capable of ensuring
>support for making a decision in real time.  Analysis of combat operations by the MNF
>in the Gulf area gives one ground to conclude that the "intellectualization" of
>reconnaissance-strike systems (RSS), automated control systems (ACS), and combat
>support systems have made it possible first, to make decisions practically in real time;
>and second, to integrate them into a single reconnaissance, command, and engagement
>system.  The experience of that local war has shown that the existence of
>reconnaissance-strike systems, which carry out in-depth effective engagement and
>broad maneuvers of strikes, is the main factor making a difference between success
>and failure in the struggle for gaining and maintaining fire superiority over the enemy.
>

>     In contemporary operations, the immediate destruction of targets as they are
>spotted is becoming the sole acceptable method of combatting such facilities as
>offensive nuclear weapons, land-based elements of RSS, self-propelled artillery
>batteries, columns of armored vehicles, and individual priority facilities of enemy
>forces.  Within the framework of the Missile and Artillery Troops of the Ground
>Troops, it is planned that this mission will be assigned to integrated reconnaissance-strike systems (IRSS) that ensure an autonomous reconnaissance of the above and
>other targets, target allocation, and the delivery of missile or rocket strikes at them
>with a full or partial automation of the command and control of all subsystems and
>their functions.  
>     The attainment of a greater effectiveness of troop and weapons command-and-control systems requires a switch from automation to "intellectualization."  Thanks to
>this an opportunity will arise to make decisions effectively in real time; the promptness
>and quality of command and control will considerably increase, while the overall
>number of servicemen involved in this process will decrease; and means of
>reconnaissance, command and control, effective engagement, and combat support
>operations will be integrated into a single system.  The development and introduction
>of ICSs will ensure the achievement of a new level of command and control of troops
>and weapons, particularly the IRSS of the Ground Troops.  Their use will make it
>possible to organize an optimum process of providing support for decision-making and
>to estimate the forces and weapons required to fulfill missions assigned to them.  The
>conduct of research in this area is indispensable since its results could help develop
>new, highly effective means of warfare and technologies.
>

>     Computerization of military command and control should eliminate current
>shortcomings and should also ensure a unified information base for existing and future
>command-and-control systems and the wide-scale introduction of new information
>technologies including artificial intelligence systems, military knowledge database
>systems, and technologies and hardware for designing specialized mathematical,
>programming, and information-linguistic backup.  This is why at present the Ministry
>of Defense (the Chief of Communications of the Russian Federation Armed Forces
>Directorate), jointly with industry, is engaged in development work on the creation of
>a Ministry of Defense telecommunications network which is intended to provide, in
>conjunction with the state information-telecommunications network, information
>collaboration with state and local organs of power.
>

>     The Ministry of Defense telecommunications network is being built with due
>consideration for the command-and-control structure of the Russian Federation Armed
>Forces and consequently allows for the development of large-scale topology across
>Russia's entire territory, ensuring the exchange of data between territorial
>communications systems with stage-by-stage development of information systems at
>the regional level.  The Ministry of Defense telecommunications network is also
>intended to ensure exchange of information in the interests of defense industry
>enterprises.  It has virtually no limitations as regards expansion possibilities to provide
>access and service to subscriber facilities and is a distributive structure functioning on
>the principles of packet switch networks.  As far as subscribers are concerned, the
>Ministry of Defense telecommunications network is an open-type network whose
>architecture conforms with the internal seven-level standard model of open system
>interface.
>

>     In parallel with the development of its telecommunications network, the
>Ministry of Defense is also engaged in extensive research and development in the
>assimilation and utilization of the latest information technologies.  These technologies
>are being used as a basis for the development of systems for the command and control
>of troops, weapons, reconnaissance, and combat support.  In this work the Ministry
>of Defense gives preference to Russian industry and orders computer hardware, local
>area networks, software, and network equipment from Russian industrial enterprises.
>

>     Russian military scientists assert that forms of information and psychological
>opposition are being improved more and more.  As a result, a breakthrough in
>electronic technologies at the beginning of the 21st century will permit the creation of
>computers based on atoms which will surpass the destructive capabilities of nuclear
>weapons in importance by several orders of magnitude.  Thus the Cold War has not
>ended; it is merely acquiring a new form.  This is why, in beginning to develop a
>military reform concept, it is impossible not to take into account the actual capabilities
>of information and psychological means of warfare.  But for this a concept of
>information and psychological opposition is needed.  It is even more necessary for the
>Russian Armed Forces to develop countermeasures in information and psychological
>opposition as quickly as possible.
>

>     The neurocomputers being developed in Russia may cause a revolution in
>military and financial spheres, according to a Russian defense industry official.  Yuriy
>Glybin, deputy head of the State Committee for Defense Industry, said that
>neurocomputers (NPCs) use technologies based on artificial neurons which are similar
>to human neurons.  Such computers are cheaper and smaller in size, but operate 1,000
>times faster than traditional computers.  Speaking at the 2nd Russian conference
>"Neurocomputers and Their Application" that opened in Moscow on 14 February
>1996, Glybin said that NPCs can be used to develop state-of-the-art high-precision
>weapons, military equipment, optic devices to detect missiles, as well as in ABM
>programs, dual technologies, etc.
>

>PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
>     According to Russian military scientists, new weapons will appear according
>to dominant law-governed patterns.  The appearance of new weapons will exert a deep
>influence not only on the methods of conducting war, but also on the definition of its
>ultimate objectives and the definition of victory itself.  In both the past and present,
>victory has meant the results of employing armed forces on the battlefield to achieve
>the physical destruction of the opponent and the seizure and occupation of his territory.
>The use of new weapons or threat thereof will be directed above all at achieving the
>most important political and economic objectives without the direct contact of
>opposing forces and without combat actions as we traditionally know them.
>

>     For example, slow-acting means that exert a concealed influence on the
>opponent's armed forces and population may appear in place of traditional weapons. 
>These means can be designed to undermine immune systems, destroy the life-sustaining elements of the human organism and human society, and seriously limit or
>destroy the population's ability to survive.
>

>     Indeed, say the Russians, the most important objective of military conflicts in
>the near-term future may become affecting the psychology of the opponent --
>individual, collective, and mass. The results of using several types of psychological
>weapons can either be direct and occur immediately after their use, or indirect and
>occur  only after many years.  Such weapons can be designed to destroy state and
>societal institutions, create mass disorder, degrade the functioning of society, and
>ultimately cause the collapse of the state.  To achieve real victory in such a war, it is
>necessary to acquire a deep knowledge not only of the opponent's armed forces, but
>also of his state and political system, the most important decision-making processes
>and mechanisms of the military-political leadership, and in general how leadership
>functions are performed.  The selectivity of the destructive capabilities of new weapons
>can result in the destruction of only the opponent's troops and population with no
>feedback effect on one's own troops and population.  
>

>     The new nature of warfare has led to the emergence of special subunits involved
>in preparing and conducting psychological operations (PSYOPs) in the armed forces
>of a number of countries.  Under combat conditions these subunits are reinforced by
>the actions of sabotage and reconnaissance subunits, military intelligence, public
>information services, and others.  The organization of such operations is regulated by
>special directives and manuals, which are developed for the armed forces of individual
>countries, as well as for their blocs, alliances, and pacts.  For example, on a NATO-wide scale there is in effect a single directive on "Principles for Planning and
>Conducting Psychological Operations."
>

>     The system of psychological operations, which are subordinate to overall
>strategic goals, comprises psychological war, whose framework is significantly
>broader than the period of the combat operations themselves.  The widespread use of
>forces and means of PSYOPs in the course of the Korean War, in Vietnam, and in the
>recent war in the Persian Gulf advanced this type of support of combat operations into
>the list of priority trends exerting influence on an enemy in the preparatory period of
>combat operations.
>

>     Depending on their level, psychological operations are subdivided into strategic,
>operational, and tactical.  Psychological operations on a strategic level are planned and
>conducted to achieve long-term goals.  The target of influence is the populace, the
>armed forces, and the government of the subject countries.  The performance of such
>operations requires coordinated actions by both the military and various governmental
>structures.
>

>     Psychological operations on the operational level support the deployment of
>armed forces, as well as the initiation and successful execution of combat operations
>by large groups of forces.  The basic features of propaganda and psychological actions
>carried out within the framework of operations at this level are that they directly or
>indirectly foster the defeat of enemy forces by evoking in the enemy lack of faith in the
>possibility of winning, and also prepare the populace of a country for the waging of
>combat operations on its territory and provide for lowering its participation in the
>conflict.
>

>     Psychological operations on the tactical level are planned and carried out in the
>interests of achieving immediate and short-term goals in order to provide direct
>support to combat units and subunits.  They are conducted with the idea of influencing
>enemy civilians and military personnel in the zone of responsibility of the commander
>of the tactical echelon.
>

>     A most important condition for the successful execution of psychological
>operations is considered to be constantly maintaining the offensive and holding the
>"psychological initiative."  Calls for certain actions should only be made when the
>situation requires this and the target of influence is in a position to understand them
>and carry them out.  The armies of various countries use almost identical technical
>means for conducting psychological operations:
>

>          duplicating and printing facilities;
>          a system of loudspeakers;
>          means of distributing leaflets by artillery, aircraft, etc.;
>          radio programs, television programs, and motion pictures made by the
>          appropriate services; and
>          systems for broadcasting radio and television which are mounted on
>          ships, tanks, vehicles, helicopters, etc.
>

>     Russian military scientists note that it is important to clearly define 
>information-and-propaganda support of operations.  They propose that it should be
>understood as a system of information-and-propaganda (information-psychological)
>activities, coordinated and interrelated in their objectives, tasks, targets, place, and
>time.  They should be conducted by the commander, staffs, other command-and-control agencies, and special units according to a single concept and plan designed to
>shape a positive public opinion about troop activity, neutralize (weaken the
>consequences of) the negative informational-psychological impacts, boost the
>servicemen's morale, strengthen the psychological endurance of the civilian
>population, and create favorable conditions for executing the missions assigned to the
>troops.
>

>     The special formations responsible for the direct organization of information-and-propaganda support  are public relations (press centers, public relations centers,
>and so forth), educational, and psychological operations (operational information,
>psychological defense, and so forth) agencies.  Experience shows that such a triad of
>special agencies should be created in the Russian Armed Forces as soon as possible. 
>Yet before creating any structures, it is important to develop a concept for information-and-propaganda support of forces -- not only in operations but also in routine
>activities, during the aggravation of the external or internal situation, in special
>military operations, and in times of war.  In some activities, signal troops can be used
>(for instance, for a prompt transmission of reports by media workers to their offices),
>EW troops, and also military counterintelligence agencies.
>

>     Russian general officers stress that in order to achieve success in an operation
>it is necessary to keep the entire process of warfare under control, with control being
>extended not only to one's own troops but also, to a certain extent, to enemy troops. 
>The kind of control which is primarily targeted at the morale of the opposing decision-making commander and which is of a reflexive character is called reflexive control. 
>Its basic objective is to place the enemy under difficult conditions if it chooses to
>continue fighting, or to force it into making decisions objectively leading to its defeat.
>

>     The enemy can be forced into making decisions desirable for the "controlling"
>side by "being intimidated with the threat of damage" (real or imagined) or by "being
>lured with advantage" (real or imagined).  In this respect disinformation, concealment,
>and deception per se are merely particular methods to this end.  "Coercion" is all the
>more effective, the more it is complex and elaborate; i.e., the enemy should make the
>conclusion about the reality of the threat of damage or the prospects of advantage
>based on the entire information received.
>

>     The difficulty of reflexive control lies in the fact that on the one hand it is
>necessary to constantly "nudge" the enemy toward achieving the desired result by
>"feeding" him logical information and, on the other hand, to keep an eye on its dosage,
>otherwise he will lose confidence.  As a term, reflexive control of the enemy lays no
>claim to originality inasmuch as it implies the use of already familiar procedures.   
>However, considering them as primary missions of maskirovka will permit
>reinterpreting one of the difficult and developing spheres of the command element's
>command-and-control activity.
>

>PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPONS
>     SHF Weapons.  According to Russian military scientists, the mechanisms of
>SHF emission on the human body can be divided arbitrarily into energy and
>information mechanisms.  The thermal effect of relatively large SHF emission power
>fluxes has been studied the most.  Depending on frequency and power, radio-frequency
>emissions disturb brain and central nervous system operation, temporarily disable,
>cause a feeling of noise and whistling difficult to endure, and damage internal organs. 
>In the latter instance there is the likelihood of a fatal outcome.  At the same time, some
>"foreign experts" believe that creation of such non-lethal weapons is very
>problematical (difficulty of obtaining requisite outputs with acceptable dimensions and
>cost of the unit, and the short effective range).
>

>     SHF generators can be used to disable electronic gear, but there are relatively
>simple methods for the latter's protection.  "Foreign specialists" deem use of super-powerful SHF generators to be more acceptable as a means of EW power; i.e., means
>that do not disable gear, but create heavy interference for it by penetrating through
>defensive filters, along "parasite" receiving channels, through unshielded openings and
>slits of the gear, and so on.
>

>     Infrasonic Weapons.  Russian military experts charge that the influence of
>infrasonic oscillations on the human body and mind was studied intensively in the
>United States during the 1960s and 1970s, including for police purposes and as
>weapons.  This work demonstrated the possibility of infrasound affecting a person's
>sensory as well as internal organs and disabling him in the presence of a certain
>combination of conditions.  One well-known project is the development of a massive
>sonic generator that can generate several infrasonic vibrations per second.  Infrasonic
>waves can exert a powerful destructive effect on the human organism.  These
>vibrations are capable of causing alarm, desperation, and even horror.  According to
>some specialists, the effect of these vibrations can cause such dysfunctions as epilepsy. 
>They can also destroy various organs and physiological systems, and cause a mass
>onset of myocardial infarction among the enemy's troops and population.  Infrasonic
>weapons can penetrate concrete and metal structures, thereby affecting personnel in
>shelters and inside combat equipment.
>

>     Psychotronic Weapons.  Russian military scientists also note that throughout
>the 1980s, abroad and above all in the United States, there was an increase in the
>activity of certain military and civilian scientists in studying problems of bioenergy
>associated with so-called paranormal human capabilities.  The division of research
>devoted to the study of paranormal phenomena has been given the name
>parapsychology.  It examines methods of receiving and transmitting information
>without using the normal organs of sense and also mechanisms of man's influence on
>physical objects and phenomena without muscular efforts.  The term psychotronics is
>widespread -- the creation of various technical devices based on energy from a bio-field, that is, a specific physical field existing around a living organism.  This is how
>the concept of psychotronic weapons, created based on using paranormal properties
>of the human organism, entered military terminology.
>

>     Presently, one can single out four basic directions of military-applied research
>in the field of bio-energy.  First, elaboration of methods of intentionally influencing a
>person's psychic activities.  The second direction includes an in-depth study of
>paranormal phenomena that are of greatest interest from the standpoint of possible
>military use -- clairvoyance, telekinesis, telepathic hypnosis, and so forth.
>

>     The framework of this phenomenon is quite broad:  on a strategic scale, it is
>possible to penetrate the enemy's main command-and-control facilities to become
>familiar with his classified documents; on the tactical level, reconnaissance can be
>conducted on the battlefield and in the enemy's rear area (the "clairvoyant-scout" will
>always be located at a safe place).  However, problems do exist -- the number of
>individuals possessing these abilities is limited, and the data received cannot be
>checked.
>

>     According to Russian military experts, using psychokinesis to destroy
>command-and-control systems and disrupt the functioning of strategic arms is already
>feasible.  The ability of a human organism to emit a certain type of energy has been
>confirmed by photography of a radiation field known as the Kirlian effect. 
>Psychokinesis is explained by the subject's generation of an electromagnetic force
>capable of moving or destroying some object.  Studies of objects destroyed as a result
>of experiments conducted have shown a different form of breakage than under the
>effect of physical force.
>

>     Discovering the mechanisms of controlling telepathic hypnosis will make it
>possible to conduct a direct transfer of thoughts from one person or group of people
>(telepathic subjects) to a selected audience.  It is important here that the subjects not
>be aware that thoughts are being implanted from an external source.  They must think
>that these are their own thoughts.  For example, personnel of an enemy formation
>executing a sudden breakthrough of defenses, instead of exploiting the success, will
>try to consolidate on the line achieved or even return to the starting line.
>

>     The third direction is studying the effect of bio-emissions on command-and-control systems, communications systems, and armament, especially electronic
>equipment, and also development of artificial bio-energy generators and plants for
>affecting enemy troops and population in order to create anomalous psychic conditions
>in them.  The fourth and last direction includes developing systems for detecting and
>monitoring artificial and natural dangerous bio-emissions and also methods of active
>and passive protection against them.
>

>     Many "Western experts," including military analysts, assume that the country
>making the first decisive breakthrough in this field will gain a superiority over its
>enemy that is comparable only with the monopoly of nuclear weapons.  In the future,
>these types of weapons may become the cause of illness or death of an object (person),
>and without any risk to the life of the operator (person emitting the command). 
>Psychotronic weapons are silent, difficult to detect, and require the efforts of one or
>several operators as a source of power.  Therefore, scientific and military circles abroad
>are very concerned over a possible "psychic invasion" and note the need to begin work
>on taking corresponding countermeasures.
>

>     The term "biological electronic device" (BED) has entered Russian military
>usage.  It involves:  
>     þ    A fifth-generation computer -- in other words, a computer which
>          communicates in ordinary human language rather than in machine
>          language;
>     þ    An artificial biological field generator;
>     þ    A bio-electronic transceiver;
>     þ    Electronic or SHF radiation sources; and
>     þ    A holographic laser.
>

>     Research has shown that a BED is capable of sensing the specifics of biological
>radiation from diseased human organs, of influencing the physical and chemical
>processes taking place within the organism, and of revealing the connections between
>the cortex and subcortex of the brain,.  A BED detects a diseased organ, receives its
>signal, boosts it many times over, and creates a field of the given type of radiation with 
>a large effective range.  A BED as it were lifts human biofield imprints.  Each person
>has their own "fingerprint," which can be recorded in a computer.  And each person
>can be identified even from part of this "fingerprint."  
>

>     But the psychotronic device with the greatest applications at the moment is the
>electronic monitoring device.  The baggage examination machine at airports is quite
>a close analogy.  Without opening a suitcase the controller can see everything inside. 
>The principle is based on illuminating the suitcase with electromagnetic waves of a
>certain band and transforming the reflected signal into a visual display.  An apartment,
>home, office, district, or street could become just such a "suitcase."  The force of the
>impact on the organism is comparable to exposure to radioactivity.  The same kind of
>structure as is used in the baggage examination device is used for this "illumination." 
>There is a radiation generator, a receiver, and a device to transform the reflected
>signals.  A generator designed for a single apartment or office would be the size of a
>tape recorder, and the radiation source could be an electrical fitting, wiring, or heating
>or water pipes.  The VHF receiver could be an incandescent lamp or a telephone wire.
>

>NATURE OF ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)
>     Just as "motorization" changed the appearance of armies and nature of warfare
>in the 1920s and 1930s, say the Russians, so now one can expect a corresponding
>result in connection with the constantly growing scale to which troops are being
>outfitted with electronics, which increases demands on their readiness to operate in a
>difficult electronic environment.  Further development of electronic equipment
>functioning in various weapon, reconnaissance, and command-and-control systems
>demands an improvement in the art of its use.  "Electronic training" is becoming a
>necessary element of the theoretical and practical training of all military cadres.
>

>     According to the Russian military, EW has become a weapon equal to "fire
>strikes" in combat effectiveness.  As a result, there has been a revision of views on
>tactical employment of electronic systems on the battlefield.  For example, the U.S. Air
>Force is said to have developed large-scale conceptual provisions for employing
>electronic equipment in support of modern military operations.  In accordance with
>these views, EW is now categorized as a priority combat mission of aviation in air
>operations.  At the same time it goes beyond the scope only of a supporting mission
>and in the near future will have the nature of an independent combat mission along
>with winning air superiority, interdicting a combat operations area, and providing
>close air support.  This is explained not only by the obvious importance of EW, but
>also by changes in its specific content.  In addition to "electronic warfare" measures,
>EW envisages a set of measures for suppression of enemy air defense and is an
>element of the fight against his battle management systems (command, control, and
>communications countermeasures.)
>

>     In the views of "NATO specialists," the purpose of EW should be to prevent the
>operation of enemy equipment within certain sectors of the electromagnetic emissions
>spectrum and to take effective advantage of them in one's own interests.  The following
>measures are taken for this purpose: arranging to monitor specific sectors of the
>spectrum of radio-band frequency emissions during the necessary period of time; using
>radar signatures and emissions of enemy electronic equipment to collect intelligence;
>depriving him of an opportunity to operate in this spectrum of electromagnetic energy
>emissions; preserving an opportunity for effective use of electromagnetic spectrum
>emissions in support of friendly missions under conditions of intensive jamming and
>the enemy's use of weapons; and ensuring security and decisive operations of friendly
>forces.
>

>     The Russian military was awestruck by the way U.S. aviation conducted
>electronic warfare in the combat operations in the Persian Gulf.  Whereas the allies
>lost 34 aircraft (1.92 percent) out of 1,763 aircraft sorties during the raids on Cologne
>in 1944, and Israeli aviation lost 46 aircraft (1.23 percent) in 3,729 sorties in the Six-Day War in 1967, American aviation lost just 27 aircraft and helicopters in 103,000
>sorties (0.26 percent) during the combat operations in the Persian Gulf.  These
>extraordinarily low losses were achieved, first of all, thanks to the most intensive
>application of means of electronic warfare in the history of war.
>

>     EW thus goes beyond the bounds of supporting the combat operations of
>aviation in air operations.  It is more and more assuming the nature of an independent
>combat mission in the winning of air superiority.  EW has two areas of principal
>application as an independent type of combat operations and special combat mission --
>fighting enemy systems of combat command and control, and suppressing his AD
>systems.
>

>     According to Russian military scientists, the results of simulation and the
>experience of the war in the Persian Gulf indicate that electronic warfare equipment
>accounts, on the average, for one-third and more of the reduced combat potential in the
>disruption of enemy command and control.  The effectiveness of fire delivery is largely
>determined by the effectiveness of the jamming of the enemy's command-and-control
>electronic gear.  A massive delivery of fire on the enemy should be preceded and
>accompanied by a massive employment of electronic warfare gear.  This is dictated by
>the fact that the high potentials of weapons and hardware are largely as efficient as
>their electronic elements and systems.  Therefore, any operational mission will involve
>an impact on the enemy's electronic facilities both by weapons and electronic warfare
>gear.  The objective will be to disrupt the command-and-control systems, to render the
>reconnaissance and air defense systems blind, and to disable the most important
>elements controlling high-precision weapon systems of the enemy.  This sharply raises
>the effectiveness of a massive delivery of fire.
>

>     Thus, an increased role of electronic warfare facilities in operations is dictated
>by the following things.  Electronic warfare makes it possible to reduce the element
>of surprise of an enemy's attack because its forces and assets are capable of acting
>virtually momentarily over a great distance; i.e., earlier than the main sources of fire-power.  Electronic warfare gear reduces the effectiveness of the enemy's deep strikes
>during air-land operations by disrupting control of its missile systems (guided-missile
>complexes), by employing offensive force groupings and aviation and artillery
>supporting them, and by disruption of cooperation between the ground troops and
>aviation.  A concerted impact by weapons and means of electronic countermeasures
>upon enemy forces, reconnaissance resources, and electronic warfare gear, as well as
>the implementation of a set of coordinated measures to ensure electromagnetic
>compatibility of the electronic equipment in the groupings of friendly troops will
>produce higher stability of command and control of troops (forces) in all operations. 
>There may be changes in the very nature of organization and conduct of electronic
>countermeasures as new tasks crop up.  For example, it may become necessary to
>counter enemy ABM defense by taking the war into outer space in order to facilitate
>the operation of space-based forces and of all armed services engaged in operations.
>

>     Russian military scientists stress that the revolutionary nature of the Gulf War
>was manifested in the fact that it marked the origin of certain new forms and methods
>of operational and tactical actions such as the electronic-fire engagement, remote-controlled battle, air-assault raids, and deep mobile operations.  The electronic-fire
>engagement played a special role in Desert Storm as the aggregate of massive, lengthy
>air-space, missile, naval, and electronic strikes.  It was the principal content of the
>operation and predetermined its successful outcome.  In this case the novelty lay in the
>fact that electronic countermeasures acted as a special weapon that was equivalent to
>fire strikes in effectiveness. 
>

>     First, Desert Storm was characterized by the significant duration of the
>electronic-fire phase (38 days), which surpassed the ground operations phase (4 days)
>by many times (ninefold). Second, a large amount of the latest EW equipment,
>airborne early-warning and control aircraft, and radar systems for aerial
>reconnaissance of ground targets and strike delivery control took part in the
>engagement.  The employment of EW equipment previously unknown to the enemy
>ensured surprise in its use.  Third, all the most important enemy targets were
>continuously subjected to electronic-fire pressure to the full depth of the operational
>alignment, which disrupted the command-and-control and communications system
>simultaneously at all command echelons from tactical to strategic.  Fourth, electronic
>and fire strikes were precisely coordinated by objective, place, and time.  By being
>combined, they  mutually supplemented and reinforced each other.  Fifth, the Air Force
>played an especially important role in fire destruction.  The intensity of its strikes (in
>some phases up to 2,000-3,000 sorties per day) had no precedent in any previous war. 
>

>
>     All this together dictated the exceptionally high effectiveness of electronic-fire
>engagement of the enemy and the winning of the fire initiative and air superiority. 
>Before the beginning of the ground phase of combat operations it became obvious that
>the opposing Iraqi force grouping had lost almost all combat effectiveness.  The
>personnel were psychologically paralyzed.  This considerably eased the task for the
>attacking mechanized and armored formations, which completed the enemy's defeat
>without encountering organized resistance.  Therefore, one of the characteristic
>features of a "technological war" is that its objectives can be achieved under certain
>conditions even without ground troops invading enemy territory -- by conducting an
>electronic-fire engagement alone.  This confirms the previous conclusion that, in the
>future, large masses of ground troops will not be required as part of an attack
>grouping. 
>

>     The Russian military therefore argues that the effectiveness of information
>systems has led "developed countries" to acknowledge the dominant role of the
>"electronic-fire" concept of waging war.  In force structure and equipment, this concept
>manifests itself not in competing for numerical superiority in motorized rifle (tank)
>formations for conducting ground battles, but in using industrial and technological
>advantages to create high-precision sea- and air-space-based weapons and global C2
>systems that facilitate "surprise first and subsequent massed radioelectronic and fire
>strikes that decide the outcome of the war without the invasion of ground forces."  A
>war's main objective is shifting away from seizure of the opponent's territory and
>toward 1) "neutralizing his political or military-economic potential  -- eliminating a
>`competitor'," and 2) "ensuring the victor's supremacy in the political arena or in raw
>materials and sales markets."  The primacy of this concept has generated a new form
>of utilizing armed forces:  the "electronic-fire operation." 
>

>     This operation will typically begin with a surprise air attack rather than an
>invasion by deployed ground forces, which permits not only seizure of the strategic
>initiative but also disruption of the opponent's strategic deployment by striking a series
>of his most important targets with a first strike.  In addition, losses of personnel are
>significantly lowered since ground troops are used only after achieving space and air
>superiority -- which guarantees their success.  Parity thus requires calculations of not
>only the fire component of combat but especially the "information component" --
>which must govern the allocation of scarce defense resources.
>

>COUNTERING C4ISR/EW SYSTEMS
>     According to General Staff analyses, a classification of possible measures for
>protecting the Russian Armed Forces against the new technologies of the RMA
>consists of the following:
>
         ACTIVE WARFARE
>          -Destruction of platforms, command-and-control equipment, and
>          weapons elements by SAM complexes (systems)
>          -Electronic and electro-optical suppression of weapons systems by EW
>          equipment
>

>         PASSIVE PROTECTION
>          -Reduction of own signature (radar, optical) and of emitted signals        
>          -Use of diversionary means
>          -Mobility, armoring
>

>         SYSTEMS PROTECTION
>          -Creation of integrated air defense systems realizing the integration of air
>          defense and EW assets
>          -Creation of alert radar field at high, medium, and low altitudes; support
>          of information communications with reconnaissance systems of other
>          branches of the Armed Forces
>

>     Russian military scientists have also examined the following specific counters
>to a variety of systems: 
>     
>

>     COUNTERS:  AGAINST RECONNAISSANCE-STRIKE COMPLEXES
>

>         Fighters Against "Airborne Elements" (Reconnaissance and
>          Communications Relay Aircraft)
>         "Front Air Operation" Against "Ground Elements"
>

>     COUNTERS:  AGAINST STEALTH
>

>         Detection: Radar, Acoustic, Laser Sensors
>          -Multi-Positional and Multi-Frequency Radars
>          -Over-the-Horizon Radars
>          -Holographic Radars
>          -Air- and Space-Based Radars
>          -EM, Infrared Systems, etc.
>          -Solid Radar Field
>         Destruction:  SAMs and Fighter Aircraft (S-300, BUK SAMs and MIG-31, SU-27, and Follow-ons)
>

>     COUNTERS:  AGAINST "NEW PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES"
>

>         Active: Detection and Destruction of Facilities
>          -Strikes By Ground- and Air-Based Radiotechnical Systems
>          -Jam Communications and Guidance Systems
>         Passive:  Troop and Equipment Protection (Fortifications, Aerosols, etc.)
>

>     COUNTERS: AGAINST C4 ISR SYSTEMS
>          -"Perturbations of Environment" (Geophysical)
>          -System Failures (Non-Lethal Weapons)
>          -Nuclear Weapons and PGMs
>          -Computer Virus
>

>     COUNTERS:  AGAINST EW SYSTEMS
>

>         Active
>          -Affect Software (e.g., Computer Virus)
>          -Strike With Beam, Super-High-Frequency, and
>            especially Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons
>          -Advanced Anti-Radiation Missiles
>          -Advanced Anti-Radiation Drones
>         Passive:  Electronic Protection and Maskirovka
>

>THIRD-GENERATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS
>     Both Soviet and Russian military scientists have long discussed so-called
>"third-generation nuclear weapons" as countermeasures to both C4ISR and EW
>systems.  Their catalogue of these weapons includes the following:
>          Neutron weapons
>          EMP and "super-EMP" weapons
>          SHF microwave weapons
>          Earth-penetrating nuclear weapons
>          Nuclear-pumped x-ray laser weapons
>          Nuclear shrapnel
>          Mini-nukes
>

>     For example, the Russian charge that in the early 1980s, U.S. military scientists
>began research aimed at creating one more kind of nuclear weapon -- a super-EMP
>with intensified electromagnetic radiation output.  They plan to use it to increase the
>intensity of the field at the earth's surface to several hundred kilovolts per meter.  In
>their calculations, the explosion of a 10-mt warhead at an altitude of 300-400 km
>above the geographic center of the United States (state of Nebraska) can disrupt the
>operation of electronic equipment on virtually the country's entire territory for the time
>necessary to disrupt retaliatory measures.
>

>     According to Russian military experts, the search for reliable destruction of
>highly hardened targets has led "U.S. military specialists" to the idea of using earth-penetrating nuclear devices.  In delivering a penetrating warhead to the target with an
>accuracy characteristic of the MX and Trident II missiles, U.S. military specialists
>figured that the probability of destroying the enemy missile silo or command post is
>near 100 percent, and instead of the two warheads now planned for each target, one
>will be sufficient. In other words, the probability of destroying targets will be
>determined only by the technical reliability of delivering warheads to them.  They are
>ear-marked above all for destroying enemy military and state command-and-control
>centers, ballistic missiles in silos, command posts, communications centers, and so on. 
>Consequently, missiles with such warheads will be used in a first strike.  The
>importance of this kind of weapon grows even more in the event of a further reduction
>in strategic offensive arms, when there will be decreased combat capabilities for
>delivering a first strike and it will be necessary to increase the kill probability of a
>target by each weapon.  "U.S. specialists" are examining the possibility of creating
>penetrating warheads equipped with a system of homing in the terminal flight phase
>for high accuracy in striking the target.
>

>     To eliminate warheads and decoys in the phase of their free flight on a ballistic
>trajectory, "U.S. specialists" also propose to use small metal particles accelerated to
>high velocities by the energy of a nuclear explosion and arbitrarily called nuclear
>shrapnel.  According to the Russians, the "nuclear shrapnel" can be used only in outer
>space under conditions of airless space, since the particles will burn up at velocities
>of over 4-5 km/sec. Its use as an anti-space weapon for destroying military satellites
>is not precluded.  Therefore, its combat use is possible for "blinding" the enemy in a
>first strike.
>

>     Russian military and scientific experts have also focused on the combat
>capabilities of low- and high-yield miniaturized nuclear devices.  When based in
>space, such weapons are said to be capable of generating a "directed shock wave"
>accurate enough to strike even hardened underground targets such as military and state
>command-and-control centers, nuclear facilities, etc.  In late 1992, General-Lieutenant
>Ye. A. Negin announced that Russia has already developed a mini-nuke whose yield
>has more than doubled and whose weight is one-hundredth of what it was. 
>

>     According to V.N. Mikhaylov, Russian minister of Atomic Energy, work now
>is being done in the world on third-generation weapons.  While atomic munitions
>using the effect of fission of heavy nuclei can be included in the first generation and
>thermonuclear weapons operating on the principle of the fusion of light nuclei in the
>second, the third generation consists of weapons with a selective effect, which act
>using a superpowerful electromagnetic pulse, superpowerful nuclear-pumped lasers,
>an intense neutron flux (the so-called neutron bomb), and so on.  An electromagnetic
>pulse is capable of damaging or disabling all kinds of electronics-based armament;
>thus, it acts above all on the most sophisticated armament and command-and-control
>and communications systems.  Third-generation nuclear weapons realistically can
>appear in the next century.  They should possess a significantly lesser damage effect
>on the environment, but a greater selective effect; they gradually will replace first- and
>second-generation nuclear weapons.
>

>     Both Soviet and Russian military scientists have long argued that "weapons
>based on new physical principles" constitute the essence and future of the new RMA. 
>Their catalogue of these weapons includes the following:
>          Geophysical/ecological weapons
>          High-frequency radio/electromagnetic wave weapons,
>          infrasonic weapons
>          Ethnic weapons
>          Directed-energy weapons 
>          Psychotronic weapons
>          Plasma weapons
>          Non-lethal weapons
>

>     As already noted, infrasonic and psychotronic weapons are viewed as
>"psychological weapons" and therefore components of psychological operations. 
>Russian scientists also warn of the danger connected with the possible development
>of "geophysical weapons."  These are weapons that generate natural catastrophes such
>as earthquakes, torrential rains, tsunamis, and destruction of the ozone layer.  It is
>possible to trigger earthquakes with underground explosions of powerful nuclear
>charges, particularly in areas of high seismic activity.  It is also possible to trigger
>tsunamis with an explosion of nuclear charges in certain areas of seas and oceans.
>Such weapons are viewed as means of disrupting command, control, and
>communications systems.
>

>     Finally, Russian military scientists consider certain non-lethal weapons to be
>elements of IW.  Their catalogue of these weapons includes the following:
>          Laser weapons
>          Incoherent light sources
>          SHF weapons 
>          Infrasonic weapons
>          EMP weapons
>          "Information weapons" (electronic news media, EW systems, special
>          programs, computer viruses, etc.)
>

>NEW ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPTS
>     According to Colonel-General M. Kolesnikov, then Chief of the General Staff,
>Russia has outlined a set of measures for Armed Forces organizational development
>aimed at their qualitative transformation.  First is an upgrading of the Armed Forces. 
>The Armed Forces structure is to be upgraded in order to increase efficiency of
>command and control and effectiveness in executing their assigned missions.  The
>strength of troops (forces) must conform to their tasking and ensure strategic
>deployment of the Armed Forces.
>

>     Second is an upgrading of the Armed Forces command-and-control system,
>which will be built and developed according to the following principles:
>

>     þ    preservation and maximum use of the existing Armed Forces command-and-control system infrastructure, with subsequent integration into the
>          country's statewide command-and-control system;
>

>     þ    balanced development of all component parts of the command-and-control system of the supreme echelon and of branches of the Armed
>          Forces and combat (naval) arms, giving priority to high-tech automated
>          systems for command and control, fire control, communications,
>          reconnaissance, navigation, electronic warfare, precision weapons
>          guidance, and preparation of data for their combat employment; and
>

>     þ    a reduced time period and expenditures for creating modern command-and-control systems and equipment through their increased degree of
>          unification and standardization.   
>

>     It is proposed to develop the command-and-control system under a unified
>concept and plan within the scope of an integrated program.  Main efforts and
>resources are to be concentrated in the following basic directions:
>

>     þ    upgrading command-and-control entities and bringing their structure,
>          makeup, and numerical strength into line with new missions based on
>          the conditions and phases of Armed Forces reorganization and with
>          consideration of troop (force) groupings being established for wartime
>          and their operational tasking;
>

>     þ    ensuring stability of the system of Armed Forces command-and-control
>          facilities under conditions of modern war, increased survivability of fixed
>          facilities for command and control of strategic nuclear forces (at the
>          strategic and tactical levels), and establishment of standardized mobile
>          command-and-control facilities supporting troops (forces) under mobile
>          defense conditions;
>

>     þ    modernizing and building up capabilities of automated command-and-control and fire-control systems with the goal of ensuring their
>          compatibility and capability for subsequent integration within the
>          framework of the combined military and state command-and-control
>          system; and
>

>     þ    establishing territorial command-and-control systems of military districts
>          on strategic and operational axes mutually tied in with the Russian
>          Federation statewide automated communications system.  
>

>     The Russian military hierarchy has long stressed that the unification of the
>fragmented information-management systems of the branches of the armed forces into
>a unified system for the Ministry of Defense, provision for its interaction with the
>information systems of the bodies of state administration and, in particular, with the
>information systems of the apparatus of the President and the Security Council, is an
>urgent task for the armed forces of the Russian Federation under prevailing military-political conditions.  The material, scientific, and technical basis for this task should
>be improved computer hardware and software support.  The following basic principles
>should be taken into account when structuring the conceptual model for the unified
>information-management system (YeIUS):
>

>       minimization of the material and financial expenditures for the creation of
>       the YeIUS;
>

>       the maximum utilization of available command-and-control, computer,
>       communications, and data-transmission systems and scientific-technical
>       developments;
>

>       centralization of access to information contained in the information and
>       computer centers of the branches of the armed forces and other command-and-control points;
>

>       coordination of information flows in the YeIUS being created and the
>       systems integrated with it according to uniform requirements;
>

>       the creation of support points for the gathering, study, depiction, and
>       analysis of data; and 
>

>       assurance of the basic principle of the command and control of troops --
>       the centralization of command and control at all levels.
>

>     The information system being created within the apparatus of the Ministry of
>Defense and General Staff of the armed forces could be used as the foundation for
>creating this YeIUS.  The principal requirement for developing the YeIUS is providing
>information to all elements of command and control and administrative leadership of
>the Ministry of Defense.  The accomplishment of the tasks enumerated above is
>impossible without the creation of scientific, technical, organizational, and financial
>foundations of the command-and-control system and the coordination of operations in
>the realm of armed forces information technology. 
>

>     The General Staff's concept for modernizing the communications system of the
>Russian Federation Armed Forces sets forth the main directions for developing and
>improving qualitative characteristics of communication systems.  Key points include:
>upgrading the communications and automated command-and-control systems for
>personnel and equipment in the missile and space defense troops, strategic nuclear
>forces, strategic reconnaissance, and electronic warfare; setting up a general-purpose
>territorial communications system for all services and combat units of the armed
>forces; upgrading field communication systems and the structure, equipment, and
>combat strength level of the communications troops; and increasing the level and
>degree of integration between communication systems and command-and-control
>automation to create a combined information and technical system of the armed forces. 
>Given the existing military-political and financial-economic realities, it is planned to
>have both a general-use territorial communication system and specialized
>communications systems for the services and combat arms in order to provide
>uninterrupted command and control in the armed forces. 
>

>     The Russian military also plans to restructure the branches of the armed forces. 
>Five branches exist at present:  the Strategic Missile Troops, the Ground Troops, the
>Air Defense Troops, the Air Forces, and the Navy.  The Military Space Troops and
>Airborne Troops are separate combat arms.  According to then Defense Minister
>Grachev, a new structure for the armed forces will be established by the year 2000,
>under which they will be divided into four branches:  the Strategic Deterrence Forces,
>the Air Force, the Navy, and the Ground Forces.  Beyond 2000, the armed forces could
>move to a three-branch structure:  it is proposed to merge the Air Force and the
>Strategic Forces into Air-Space Forces.
>

>     According to General-Major V.I. Slipchenko, the Russian Armed Forces will
>consist of two main components by the year 2000: the Strategic Strike Forces and
>Strategic Defense Forces.  But a new and separate branch will form between them,
>conditionally called the EW/Information Troops.  These forces will operate either with
>the Strategic Strike Forces when an offensive operation is under way, or with the
>Strategic Defense Forces when a defensive operation is under way.
>

>     The new EW/IW groupings will include existing missile-attack warning
>systems, space monitoring systems, SIGINT systems, and others.  They will also
>include information-strike assets capable of targeting analogous enemy information
>systems, and a comprehensive infusion of ECM and ECCM assets.  Directorates for
>both IW and EW have already been established in the General Staff.
>

>     In search of ever-greater centralization of command and control, Russia's
>Defense Ministry plans to simplify the armed forces coordination system by
>transforming the eight operational military districts into four combined territorial
>commands.  Each will be headed by a deputy defense minister, who will exercise
>control over all of the forces and assets in his region.  According to then Defense
>Minister Pavel Grachev, the four territorial groups will be called Northern, Southern,
>Ural-Baykal, and Far Eastern. 
>

>     All branches of the Russian Armed Forces have designed blueprints for
>reorganization to adapt to the new information environment:
>

>     Air Forces.  According to General P. Deynekin, CINC of the Russian Air
>     Forces, the ideal Air Force organizational structure is based on the principle of
>     centralized command and control by the Air Force commander-in-chief for the
>     commands (Long-Range, Frontal, and Military Transport Aviation, and the
>     Reserve and Personnel Training Command), and by the commanders of Long-Range Aviation, Frontal Aviation, and Military Transport Aviation for large
>     strategic formations (combined units and separate air units).  At a time when
>     the Russian Armed Forces, including the Air Force, are being cut, when there
>     are diverse military threats, and when they are uncertain of the areas where
>     potential military danger could escalate into a military threat, the principle of
>     strict centralization of the command and control of large strategic formations
>     (combined units) is said to be one of the most important conditions for
>     enhancing the effectiveness of the combat operations of aviation combined units
>     (units).  The Air Forces are thus being reorganized according to the territorial
>     principle on the model of the Air Defense Troops.  
>

>     Air Defense Troops.  According to General V. Prudnikov, CINC of the Russian
>Air Defense Troops, the Order of the President of the Russian Federation and the
>corresponding order of the Ministry of Defense gave a new face to the Air Defense
>Troops.  In the future they will be the basis for the creation of Russia's air-space
>defense.  That is a natural future, because the air and space spheres are so interrelated
>that they have long been viewed as a seamless whole.
>

>     The present air defense system can and must become the basis of air-space
>defense because it is built on a territorial principle, which implies not the interworking
>of large strategic formations of Air Defense Troops and of air defense forces and assets
>of military districts, the Air Force, and the Navy, as was the case previously, but
>unified command and control of them in air defense zones and areas.  The
>establishment of corresponding mobile reserves of the Air Defense Troops also is
>envisaged for a timely buildup of efforts in crisis situations.
>

>     National Air-Space Defense.  According to Colonel-General G. Kondratyev, the
>Russian military plans to create an air-space reconnaissance system based on the
>reconnaissance information assets of all branches of the armed forces and other
>Russian ministries (in particular the federal reconnaissance and air-space surveillance
>system) capable of detecting offensive air-space weapons and at the same time
>forming an integral part of the overall early-warning system.  Thus, all forces within
>the Air-Space Defense System will receive unified information, and on a real-time
>basis.
>

>     Considering the great length of Russia's state border, the importance and
>number of installations to be covered, the swiftness of air and air defense engagements
>and battles (which surpass the swiftness of engagements and battles on land and sea
>by many times), and that essentially all branches of the armed forces have troops,
>forces, and assets capable of performing air-space defense missions, the conclusion
>can be drawn that they should be integrated to the maximum extent.  This is possible
>only within the framework of a unified national air-space defense system based on a
>common responsibility and unified direction of training and operations of all air-space
>defense troops and forces.
>

>     A legitimate question arises:  How should it differ fundamentally from the
>former USSR air defense system?  First of all, by common programs for developing
>arms and training cadres for air-space defense in place of parallel resolution of these
>problems in other branches of the armed forces.  Secondly, by unified planning and
>command and control of all air-space defense forces at the strategic, operational, and
>tactical levels instead of unified planning at the strategic level and coordination at
>operational and tactical levels.  And thirdly, by deeper information. algorithmic, and
>fire ties among missile-space defense and air defense systems instead of their
>essentially independent existence.  Realizing effective methods for combatting existing
>and future targets operating under a unified concept throughout their range of air-space
>employment altitudes requires (especially with limited resources) a unification of
>efforts of all troops, above all reconnaissance and air-, missile-, and space-attack
>warning.
>

>     Ground Troops.  According to General Semenov, CINC of the Russian Ground
>Troops, the Ground Troops will be developed along the following main directions:
>

>     þ creating a unified automated command-and-control and fire-control system
>       and its subsystem;
>

>     þ developing multipurpose, multichannel automated combat systems,
>       including reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-fire complexes;
>

>     þ developing models and complexes of arms and military equipment based on
>       new physical principles and non-traditional engineering solutions using
>       elements of artificial intelligence;
>

>     þ ensuring high mobility, survivability, noise immunity, all-weather
>       capability, and compatibility of armament complexes; and
>

>     þ reducing the nomenclature of arms and combat equipment and time periods
>       and expenditures for their creation through standardization of completing
>       elements, assemblies, instruments, and hardware.
>

>     Signal Troops.  Colonel-General G.P. Gichkin has noted that world experience
>points to the expediency of creating general-purpose communication systems based on
>the territorial-zonal principle (territorial communication system).  Plans for the
>development of the communication system in the Russian Federation Armed Forces
>provide for the creation and series production of modern communication equipment
>and automated command-and-control systems, which to some extent would correspond
>to the world's troop communication technology level.  Several directions can be
>singled out here:
>

>       Development of satellite communication systems.  The Russians plan to
>       increase their carrying capacity, survivability, and jamming resistance, and
>       also to acquire new frequency bands and use new methods of multi-station
>       access to relay stations.
>

>       Upgrading radio communication systems.  The Russians plan to use modern
>       methods of ensuring jamming resistance and adaptation to radio-wave
>       dissemination, which will substantially increase radio channel capacity.
>

>       Development of radio-relay and tropospheric communication means.  The
>       Russians plan to develop unified complexes of digital anti-jam
>       communication stations with an expanded carrying capacity and
>       communication range in stationary, automobile, and container options.
>

>       Development of land-line communications systems.  The Russians plan to
>       increase the carrying capacity and operational capabilities of digital
>       transmission systems, and ensure a wide employment of fiber-optic
>       transmission systems.
>

>       Development of second networks.  The Russians plan to ensure integration,
>       to reduce linking and message transmission time, to increase the number of
>       users, to enhance the reliability and reduce the weight and dimensions of the
>       equipment, and to create unified encryption and communication terminal
>       complexes, ensuring the transmission of various types of information.
>

>       Automation of the command-and-control system.  The Russians plan to
>       intensify the introduction of information technology into the command-and-control process in the armed forces (especially at the operational-tactical
>       level), in order to upgrade the effectiveness of day-to-day activity and the
>       operational preparation of staffs and troops at all levels, including in the
>       course of operational training sessions and command-and-staff exercises -- 
>       without bringing the troops into the field and without target practice.  The
>       final stage includes R&D work on disseminating information technology in
>       various governing bodies of the Defense Ministry.  They plan to use the
>       hardware and software options developed as a result of this R&D work in
>       equipping some military districts with secure local computing networks
>       based on personal computers, and in the future to extend them to the entire
>       armed forces.
>

>     Radio-Technical Troops.  According to Colonel-General V.F. Migunov,
>commander of the Radio-Technical Troops of the Air Defense Troops, Russia is
>working to establish a Federal Air-space Surveillance and Control System based on
>the Radio-Technical Troops.  This system is being established through integrated use
>of radar systems and equipment in the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Transport. 
>In accordance with Russian Federation Presidential Edict, they are intended for
>information support of the Armed Forces and Civil Aviation, above all for performing
>air defense and air traffic control missions.  The basis of the federal system will be the
>radar system of Air Defense Troops and radar surveillance equipment of branches of
>the Armed Forces and Civil Aviation.  In the course of 1994, a central commission and
>interdepartmental zonal commissions were formed which are coordinating the new
>system's establishment, and the formation of dual-purpose information elements is
>next in line.  Work also is under way to certify technical equipment, and normative-legal documents are being prepared.
>

>     The concept of phased development of the federal system envisages setting up
>dual-purpose information elements in early 1995; i.e., radio-technical subunits and
>positions of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Transport must be capable of
>performing missions of the related department in addition to their own specific
>missions.  There already is experience of such work in Karelia, the North Caucasus
>region, and Siberia.  For example, problems of using Ministry of Transport radar
>positions for building up the radar field in a given region were worked out in the
>course of the Sibir-95 command-and-staff exercise held in April.  The Federal
>Surveillance and Air-space Control System now being established will bring together
>radar assets of all branches of the armed forces and civilian departments.  A unified
>data bank is being established with the help of these assets.  This will solve to a
>considerable extent the problems of closing gaps in the radar field.
>

>POST-ELECTION PRIORITIES
>     In his June 1996 election program, President Yel'tsin stressed that given the
>real economic conditions and the military-political situation, it will be necessary over
>the next four-five years to focus on resolving the task of creating by the year 2000 the
>scientific, technical, and technological groundwork required for Army and Navy
>rearmament.  While maintaining Russia's nuclear deterrent potential at the proper
>level, he continued, Russia needs to devote more attention to developing the entire
>range of means of information warfare, the development of precision weaponry, the
>individual protection of servicemen, systems for ensuring mobility, and the
>development of the defense infrastructure (the airfield network, roads, Navy basing
>systems, and so forth).  The Defense Ministry and the General Staff must ensure the
>utmost level of technical equipment and strength levels for combined and other units
>in the most important areas and the main armed forces segments.  Within the
>framework of overall defense spending, Russia must increase the share of resources
>allocated to research and development, to enhancing the level of technical equipment
>available to the Army and Navy, to modernizing armaments and military hardware,
>to combat and operational training, and so forth.
>

>     The new defense minister, General I.N. Rodionov, has long stressed that
>military reform is not quantitative changes in the armed forces, but radical qualitative
>transformations in the very essence of the state's military system.  The military-technical policy is a most important direction in the country's activities safeguarding
>its security and also one of the elements of the national industrial policy.  It is directly
>linked to the formation and execution of the state defense order for armament and
>military equipment.  Work on the defense order today  is assuming a most important
>significance for the country's future, since this is the only opportunity to preserve the
>nucleus of high technologies which are basically concentrated in the defense complex. 
>Destroy this nucleus and the trend of turning Russia into a raw materials appendage
>of the world market will become irreversible.  The military-technical policy must make
>the most effective use of achievements in the area of computer science in order to
>eliminate the imbalance between individual components within the weapon system
>itself.  Thus, having outstanding models of weapons, the Russians often lag behind in
>means of their information support, which leads to an increase in ammunition
>expenditure and puts an excessive load on the support system.
>

>     Shortly after his 1996 appointment as defense minister, General Rodionov
>unveiled a radical military reform plan that continues to generate debate.  The plan
>apparently includes slashing the Ground Troops from about 60 to 12 divisions,
>including a fifty-percent reduction in the Airborne Troops; altering defense budget
>priorities to focus on information and emerging technologies; and significantly
>delaying planned weapons procurement in order to increase R&D expenditures.  He
>has already sacked opponents of radical reform, and appears fully capable of
>implementing the plan even if Lebed does not emerge as the next president of Russia. 
>If implemented, his reforms would create the basis for a gradual increase in Russian
>military capabilities over the next decade.
>

>     Most currently, General Viktor Samsonov, the new chief of the Russian General
>Staff, has stressed the emergence of a new element in the meaning of war: the erosion
>of distinctions between military and non-military means of struggle.  He asserts that
>military confrontation has entered a new phase when the modern means, forms, and
>methods of this confrontation make it possible to attain the strategic objectives of war
>without the results which were traditional in the recent past (conquest of territory and
>so on).  This specific approach was adopted by the United States when planning and
>implementing Operation Desert Storm.
>

>     The concepts of information, economic, financial, ecological, and other types
>of warfare, which are now becoming increasingly widespread, extend beyond the
>strictly theoretical bounds and acquire a perfectly specific and practical meaning.  For
>example, the Russian-U.S. scientific conference held in Moscow at the end of 1995
>noted the high effectiveness of the "information warfare" systems, which in
>combination with the use of highly accurate weapons and "non-military means of
>influence" make it possible to disorganize the system of state administration, hit
>strategically important installations and groupings of forces, and affect the mentality
>and moral spirit of the population.  In other words, the effect of the use of these means
>is comparable with the damage resulting from the effect of weapons of mass
>destruction.
>

>     Scientific and technical progress and the introduction of high technologies in
>the defense sectors of industry make it possible to develop highly effective systems
>based on new principles of physics.  Intensive work is under way to develop
>geophysical, ozone (exotic), neutron, accelerator, plasma, laser, psychotronic, and
>other types of modern weapons.  They are capable of significantly changing the
>material base of armed struggle and the appearance, nature, and content of war.
>

>     Finally, Defense Minister Rodionov has stressed that the VPK has lobbied for
>the army to purchase technology and arms that it really does not need.  All this has
>been explained by the need to maintain production and jobs in the defense complex. 
>As a result of this faulty practice, funds have been spent irrationally, and there has not
>been enough money for research and design work.  Rodionov has already echoed
>Yel'tsin's proposal to the government that a significant portion of the funds previously
>planned for the purchase of arms be spent on R&D.  "We can put off rearming for ten
>years," he argues, "but get twenty-first century equipment and weapons."  It should
>be noted that the Russian government, including the Defense Council, has approved
>this proposal.    
>

>WHITHER THE VPK?  
>     In a December 1992 interview, Deputy Defense Minister A. Kokoshin, head of
>the Military-Technical Policy Council, noted that the Russian military is trying to
>change the entire cycle between fundamental research and the final product (launching
>series production of a piece of military inventory.)  One of the main objectives of
>Russian military-technical policy is to form a "scientific-technical reserve" in the
>sphere of "critical technologies," to include dual-purpose technologies.  This
>"scientific-technical reserve" is equivalent to the Western concept of "hovering," which
>permits defense industries to "leap over" a generation of weaponry by focusing on the
>development of prototypes and avoiding costly series production.  In other words, the
>R&D establishment fully develops a new technology or system concept without
>proceeding to the next stage of acquisition until the situation warrants.  This can be
>achieved, say the Russians, by 1) reducing procurement of arms and equipment in
>series production, and 2) maintaining R&D and production capacities to ensure the
>development and "rapid surge production" of emerging combat technologies.  As
>already noted, Defense Minister Rodionov's reform plan embodies this concept
>precisely.
>

>     In June 1993, then Defense Minister Grachev announced that the Russian
>Defense Ministry now has "prototype development plans for all types of armaments."
>As Kokoshin has noted, "We are also planning... the establishment of a scientific and
>technical capability that would permit us to achieve a qualitative leap and to expand
>mass production of the most modern equipment at a time when we are a little richer."
>

>     In early 1995, the Russian government unveiled a new federal program: the
>"National Technological Base" program.  Reflecting both the country's current lags
>and long-term requirements, the program focuses on the development of the following:
>

>       Information technologies
>       Technologies based on new materials
>       Microelectronics, nanoelectronics
>       Optical, laser, radioelectronics
>       Power generation, energy savings
>       Advanced engines
>       Highly productive industrial equipment
>       Special chemicals
>       Energy-intensive materials
>       Unique nuclear, environmentally safe technologies
>       Biotechnologies
>

>     Like the new military reform plan, the federal program emphasizes a shift away
>from material-intensive and toward science-intensive systems: away from ballistic
>missiles, submarines, heavy bombers, tanks, and artillery and toward advanced C4ISR
>and EW systems.
>

>     Since the 1970s-1980s, says Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin, and then in
>the course of operation Desert Storm, the prime task has been to win superiority in the
>information sphere; then comes the struggle for air superiority; and only after that the
>struggle for fire and space superiority.  The emergence of information warfare assets
>and means of impacting on the information space of another state necessitates the
>development of theoretical and practical foundations for conducting information
>warfare, and consolidating the theoretical basis of this form of warfare as part and
>parcel of military art.  The center of gravity in modern warfare is shifting away from
>the large-scale effective engagement of enemy personnel, weaponry, combat hardware,
>and military installations toward the destruction (incapacitation) of elements that are
>key to the opposing side's ability to put up organized resistance.  The appearance of
>means and systems of purposive information impacting on the information space of
>another state has raised squarely the question of the need for the development of the
>theoretical and practical fundamentals of an information confrontation and the use of
>information weapons in the armed struggle.  The intensive development of new forms
>and modes of operation of the armed forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical
>levels under conditions of the use of information weapons is essential.
>

>     Information confrontation should be an inalienable part of military art, and the
>armed forces should be ensured the possibility of conducting -- in conjunction with
>other troops and military elements and authorities (the Federal Government
>Communications and Information Agency, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the
>Federal Border Service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Federal Security Service,
>the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and others) -- information-impact operations
>coordinated in terms of goal, targets, place, time, types of information weapons, and
>methods of their application.  This presupposes the need for the most in-depth study
>of the political and social structures of various countries, their systems of state and
>military command and control, psychological and behavioral stereotypes, etc.  This
>study should be conducted on the basis of the latest achievements of the social
>sciences -- social psychology, political science, ethnography and ethnology, and so
>forth.
>

>     Instead of a reliance on massive effective fire against personnel, weapons,
>military hardware, and military targets, the main efforts should be concentrated
>increasingly on the destruction (disruption of the operation) of the components on
>which the enemy's capacity for organized resistance depends.  The main efforts in
>determining the directions and priorities in the development of the means and methods
>of armed struggle within the framework of the long-term arms program proposed by
>the Ministry of Defense will, accordingly, be geared to the creation of forces and
>facilities of information warfare (electronic warfare, intelligence, communications,
>operational command-and-control systems, and facilities for the protection of
>command-and-control systems against enemy influence).
>

>     In late 1996, Kokoshin told ITAR-TASS that the military-industrial sector's
>dramatic problems with defense orders had not barred its research and development
>programs in recent years.  He cited serious developments in hydro-acoustic
>engineering, radars, and computer hardware for control of troops and weapons.  In the
>nearest future, new weapon systems will appear such as anti-aircraft missile systems
>and means for radioelectronic warfare that will bring the Russian Army to the level of
>the best models in the world.
>

>